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Introduction
The nature of intellectual property law, now more than ever, reflects international
considerations. Trademark law is no exception to this general statement. In the last few
years, there have been several significant developments in the public international law of
trademarks and unfair competition.1 In 1994, in addition to the Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (the TRIPS Agreement),2 which encompassed all
forms of intellectual property protection and made the obligations contained therein
subject to state-to-state dispute settlement before the World Trade Organization (the
WTO),3 the Trademark Law Treaty (the TLT) rationalized the procedural aspects of
trademark registration, maintenance and assignment.4 More recently still, the Standing
Committee on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geographical Indications
(the SCT) of the World Intellectual Property Organization (the WIPO) developed
proposals to be (and that were) endorsed by the WIPO member states on the protection of
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1
The most significant progress in this field internationally has been with respect to the protection of
registered trademarks. But this Paper addresses the protection of both registered and unregistered
trademarks; the latter is particularly important in the United States. The protection of unregistered marks
is, of course, only one of the numerous topics covered by national laws against unfair competition.
International commitment to protect against unfair competition is longstanding, see Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T.
1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, art. 10bis, but consensus on specifics has been noticeably lacking. See WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANISATION, PROTECTION AGAINST UNFAIR COMPETITION: ANALYSIS OF THE
PRESENT WORLD SITUATION 9-17 (1994).
2
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments–Results of the
Uruguay Round, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
3
See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Legal Instruments—Results of the
Uruguay Round, Annex 2, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 112
(1994); Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994).
4
See Trademark Law Treaty, Oct. 27, 1994, 34 Indus. Prop. L. & Treaties 3-010, 001 (Jan. 1995).

well-known marks.5 Finally, throughout the past decade there has been significant
regional harmonization of trademark law, particularly within the European Union (the
EU).6 In contrast, the private international aspects of the protection of trademarks have
received somewhat less attention. But these private international aspects may turn out to
be equally as important as public law developments. In this Paper, I outline some of the
private international law issues that trademark law must confront, and consider a range of
approaches that might be considered in addressing those issues.
The content of private international law remains in large part a function of
national rules on three topics: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition of judgments.
But in the case of intellectual property law, these rules are formulated and applied against
a backdrop of public international obligations. Before turning to existing and proposed
national rules of private international law, therefore, Part I of the Paper considers the
extent to which existing public international law – as contained in international trademark
agreements and conventions – dictates or constrains the content of these rules. The Paper
will then follow the structural agenda common to private international lawyers. That is to
say, in Part II, I will consider the adjudicative jurisdiction of national courts over
trademark disputes. In Part III, I will turn to the question of “applicable law” or “choice
of law.” Finally, in Part IV, I will address the recognition and enforcement of judgments
in trademark cases.
It should be noted, however, that this tripartite analytical structure, while
consistent with historical study of private international law, does not neatly correspond to
the analysis that courts (or scholars) apply to disputes regarding the international
exploitation and use of trademarks. In particular, as explained more fully below, the
questions of jurisdiction and applicable law are frequently and inevitably intertwined.7
And the concepts deployed to determine the applicable national trademark law might
appropriately be borrowed from solutions being developed in assessing jurisdiction to
adjudicate multistate trademark cases.8 Moreover, some of the solutions that I consider
under the nominal heading of “choice of law” are more concerned with substantive
trademark law than would be traditional analyses of applicable law.9 Finally, if a
proposed Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Judgments is adopted
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See Joint Resolution Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks, General Report of
the Assemblies of the Member States of WIPO, 34th Annual Series of Meetings ¶¶ 171-83, WIPO Doc.
A/34/16 (Sept. 29, 1999).
6
See Council Directive 89/104 on the harmonisation of trade mark law, [1989] O.J. L40/1 [hereinafter, the
EU Trademark Directive]; see generally Annette Kur, Harmonization of Trademark Laws in Europe, 28
I.I.C. 1(1997). One might regard the EU developments as having private law aspects. This is especially
true of the Trademark Regulation, which creates a system under which individuals may directly acquire and
enforce rights, rather than the Directive, which creates public law obligations for states to implement.]. See
Council Regulation 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community Trademark, 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1
[hereinafter, the EU Trademark Regulation] (establishing the Community Trademark). The interaction of
the Trademark Directive and the Trademark Regulation as the reforming instruments of trademark law
within the EU merely highlights the porous nature of the line between public and private law developments.
7
See infra text accompanying notes 96-102.
8
See infra text accompanying notes 82-94.
9
See infra text accompanying notes 213-257.
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in the near future, jurisdictional rules may come in part to define the parameters of
courts’ international obligations to recognize foreign trademark judgments.10
The range of trademark disputes implicating these three topics of private
international law is limitless. Several paradigmatic disputes can, however, be identified.
These merit a brief preliminary explication here because each type of case may raise
different challenges for private international law. First, because trademark rights are (like
all intellectual property rights) territorial in nature,11 different producers may own rights
in the same mark for the same class of goods in different countries. Producer X may use
a mark in state A that is separately used (and owned and registered) by Producer Y in
state B.12 This may occur because each initially markets its product in only one country
or because, although Producer X wishes to market its goods in both countries, it finds
upon seeking to register the mark in state B that the mark is already owned by Producer
Y. International trademark disputes will arise where one producer seeks to expand into
the territory of the other, or where the goods of one producer travel into the market of the
other. That is, both parties may have legitimate, discrete national trademark rights that
conflict only when one or both seek to operate in the international marketplace.
Second, a defendant in state B may use in that state a mark that is within the scope
of a mark owner’s exclusive control in state A but not in state B. If the goods bearing the
defendant’s mark enter state A or come to the attention of the consumers in state A, can
the mark owner restrain the defendant’s use? The dissonance between the scope of the
mark owner’s rights in state A and state B might in some cases be attributed to different
national legal rules. For example, the defendant’s use of the mark may incontrovertibly
give rise to no likely confusion with the plaintiff’s goods, but may be likely to dilute the
distinctiveness of the mark. If state A accords mark owners protection against dilution,
while state B allows the mark owner to restrain only uses that give rise to likely
confusion, the defendant’s use would fall within the scope of the mark owner’s rights in
state A but not state B.13 Alternatively, the different scope of rights attaching to the mark
10

See infra text accompanying notes 289-98.
The premise of territoriality pervades existing analysis of all intellectual property law. But trademark
law may be the form of intellectual property right most susceptible to disintegration caused by the
breakdown of territoriality because the scope of trademark rights is especially grounded in geography. See
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, (National) Trademark Laws and the (Non-National) Domain Name System, 21 U.
PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 495, 507 (2000).
12
In most countries, trademark rights are acquired by registration. In a few countries, most notably the
United States, rights are acquired and priority determined by use of the mark. See Daniel C. Schulte, The
Madrid Trademark Agreement’s Basis in Registration-Based Systems: Does the Protocol Overcome Past
Biases? (Part I), 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 595 (1995) (describing the different rules of
priority in national trademark systems). Thus, Producer Y may own the rights by virtue of having
registered the mark first even if it had made no use of the mark.
13
Although the trend in national trademark laws is clearly to grant protection against dilution, see, e.g., 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c), international law does not mandate such protection (even for well-known marks). See
Paul Heald, Trademarks and Geographical Indications: Exploring the Contours of the TRIPS Agreement,
29 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 635, 642 (1996) (interpreting protection required for well-known marks under
Article 16 of the TRIPS Agreement); see also Robert C. Denicola, Some Thoughts on The Dynamics of
Federal Trademark Legislation And The Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 75,
84 n.40 (1996) (suggesting that "it is not at all clear" that Article 16(3) requires the enactment of a dilution
11
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in state A and state B may result from factual differences pertaining in the different
states. For example, different marketing practices in the different countries may make
the use of the marks confusingly similar in one state but not the other. Competitive
conditions or countervailing free expression policies in the different states may require
that the mark be left unprotected and available for competitors and/or the public in one
state but not the other.
Third, there may be a right to use a mark in one country but not in another
because of different determinations of trademark validity rather than legal differences on
the question of scope of rights. For example, the same term may be regarded as
distinctive in one country but not in another as a result of different consumer
understanding of the meaning of that term.14
Substantively, the issues presented by these cases may suggest that the problems
are nothing more than the extension of typical local trademark problems to a
geographically broader market. Globalization, it might be argued, has changed the
territorial scope of a producer’s interests but the trademark disputes remain the same in
kind. The temptation thus is simply to apply traditional trademark concepts – for
example, priority of rights (whether defined by registration or use), or likelihood of
confusion – to the new setting of an increasingly international marketplace. For
international trademark policymakers operating under this assumption, globalization
would thus present three principal tasks: first, the harmonization of substantive rules of
national trademark law in order to reduce the costs and uncertainties of producers
operating in the international marketplace;15 second, for similar reasons, the development
of mechanisms designed to facilitate the registration of marks on an international basis;16
and, third, the decision whether to recognize separate trademark rights linked to broader
geographic markets (as the EU has with the Community Trademark)17 or to affirm the
sanctity of existing national borders in the grant and recognition of trademark rights (as
statute). But cf. H.R. Rep. No. 374, 104th Cong. 1st Sess. 4 (1995) (suggesting that “the recently-concluded
[TRIPS Agreement] . . . includes a provision designed to provide dilution protection to famous marks”).
14
See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
15
The TRIPS Agreement, the work of the WIPO SCT in developing resolutions presented to the WIPO
Assemblies, and the harmonization work of the EU can be grouped under this heading. See supra notes 2,
5-6.
16
The principal mechanisms through which this goal has been pursued are the Madrid Agreement and the
(separate, but related) Madrid Protocol. See Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration
of Marks, adopted Apr. 14, 1891, 175 C.T.S. 57; Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning
the International Registration of Marks, adopted June 28, 1989 (establishing a centralized international
filing system to facilitate acquisition of national trademark rights in several countries); see generally,
Jeffrey M. Samuels and Linda B. Samuels, The Changing Landscape of International Trademark Law, 27
GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 433 (1994). The Trademark Law Treaty, see supra note 4, has also
contributed to this project by effecting the convergence of the procedural mechanisms by which national
trademark registrations are acquired, maintained and transferred.
17
The holder of a Community Trademark Registration owns unitary rights in the mark throughout the
territory of the EU. See generally EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TRADEMARK: COMMENTARY TO THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY REGULATION (Mario Franzosi ed. 1997); RUTH ANNAND & HELEN NORMAN, BLACKSTONE’S
GUIDE TO THE COMMUNITY TRADEMARK (1998); GRAEME B. DINWOODIE, WILLIAM HENNESSEY AND
SHIRA PERLMUTTER, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Ch. 8.B.2 (Matthew
Bender 2001) (forthcoming).
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remains more typical, and which is consistent with the basic premise of extant
international trademark conventions).18
The internet may affect this strategic calculation by creating additional types of
disputes that throw up more intractable problems of private international law.19 The
conservative solution of applying traditional national notions of priority or infringement
is premised upon the notion that international disputes can, in the final equation, simply
be reduced (localized) to particular domestic markets. That is, international commercial
activity can be fictionally reconfigured by trademark lawyers to conform to the
nationalistic (nineteenth century) premises of international trademark law. The internet
undermines this premise because it is in large part non-national; certain internet use may
(but need not)20 be viewed as simultaneous use in almost every country of the world.
Cyberspace might be regarded as akin to any new territory that one, and only one,
of several existing mark owners may add to their existing territories. But the scenario
presented by cyberspace is different in at least one important way: the ownership of the
exclusive right to use the mark in this new territory – cyberspace – may impinge upon the
ability of the respective mark owners to exercise fully the rights that they already own in
existing territories. If Producer X owns the mark ORANGE for computers in Country A
and Producer Y owns that same mark in Country B, acquisition of the rights in Country C
determines only which of the two producers can now market their goods in that new
country. But if the new territory for which exclusive rights are granted is not Country C,
but cyberspace, the exclusive right to use the mark online will affect the ability of the
respective producers to use the marks that each owns in Country A or Country B.
Should online use be adjudged by the separate dictates of national laws, as is use
in offline international commerce? If so, which national law should have primary (or
exclusive) claim to regulate that use? If such use can be localized in any country where
internet access is available, how should the competing prescriptive claims of different
countries be weighed? What deference or recognition is owed the decision of courts in
one country deciding a case over which several national courts or laws might have a valid
claim?
These tougher questions are perhaps raised most acutely by the use of trademarks
as part of domain names (which, as part of the infrastructure of the internet, appear to
have very little grounding in national regulation or national culture).21 Again, a variety of
model disputes may be contemplated. Which of the different owners of legitimate
national trademark rights in the word APPLE for grocery stores is entitled to ownership
18

See Persons Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, n.18 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (rejecting the argument that, in light
of the “world economy,” priority of rights should be determined by first use anywhere, even use outside the
United States).
19
See Torsten Bettinger and Dorothee Thum, Territorial Trademark Rights in the Global Village –
International Jurisdiction, Choice of Law and Substantive Law for Trademark Disputes on the Internet
(Part One), 31 I.I.C. 162, 163 (2000) (“Hitherto, the most frequent cause of legal disputes on the internet
has been the infringement of trademark rights”).
20
See infra text accompanying notes 227-57.
21
See Dinwoodie, supra note 11, at 497-500.
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of the domain name registration apple.com (of which there can, under the current
configuration of the internet, only be one registration)?22 Even if the mark APPLE for
grocery stores is owned by the same mark owner in every country, should the domain
name registration be owned by that mark owner or should the domain name registration
be owned by the owner of the mark APPLE for computers, which can (and does) co-exist
comfortably in the offline world with the mark APPLE for grocery stores? And what
remedies might either of these mark owners have against a third person, with no
trademark rights in the mark APPLE, who secures the domain name registration
apple.com as a result of the first-come-first-served philosophy underlying domain name
registration processes?23 Do (and should) these remedies vary depending upon whether
such third parties register the domain name in bad faith (loosely defined as
cybersquatting) or for some legitimate purpose?
These questions appear to differ more significantly from those found in the
traditional international trademark dispute because of the ubiquity of internet use. This
detaches the problems described above from the existing model of trademark rights that
are limited by geographic markets (the principle of territoriality) or product markets (the
principle of specialty). But one response to these new questions might be to draw a line
between international issues that arise offline and those that involve conduct or uses of
marks on the internet (or perhaps those involving domain names). Even if the
characteristics of the internet justify a slightly different, or more tailored approach, to
accommodate those particularities, it could be argued that this does not mandate a
wholesale revision of international trademark law. Indeed, the recent (and extremely
important) work of the WIPO SCT embodies this philosophy.24 Restricting novel
approaches to the online (or narrower, domain name) context would ensure that the
internet “tail” does not wag the offline “dog.”
Any effort to distinguish between international trademark problems generally and
internet-induced problems specifically should however recognize the extent to which, for
many industries, internet marketing has become integral to international (and even
national) commerce.25 The extent to which online marketing has become an integral part
of branding strategy is such that companies may, by virtue of prohibitions against use of a
mark on the internet, effectively be obliged to reconfigure offline marketing to avoid use
of that mark in non-internet sales and marketing.26 Thus, any rules that impose restrictive
standards on producer trademark uses online may effectively be exported to the offline
22

See id. at 499.
See generally id.
24
See infra text accompanying notes 227-57.
25
Absent the ability to market (and, perhaps, for certain entertainment industries, deliver) products or
services online, producers may be placed at a significant disadvantage. Indeed, competitive necessities
may extend further, depending upon evolving consumer practices, to a need to use one’s trademark as a
domain name. See Dinwoodie, supra note 11, at 505-06 (discussing the need to own domain name
registrations corresponding to existing trademarks).
26
See Torsten Bettinger and Dorothee Thum, Territorial Trademark Rights in the Global Village –
International Jurisdiction, Choice of Law and Substantive Law for Trademark Disputes on the Internet
(Part Two), 31 I.I.C. 285, 291 (2000) (noting the possible knock-on effects of restrictive online rules on the
offline world given that “the use of different trademarks for online and offline marketing of the same
product is hardly practicable”).
23
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world, and the standards of the internet may become the standards of global commerce
generally. This is, of course, particularly problematic if competing expansive national
assertions of legislative jurisdiction effectively preclude the use of large numbers of
trademarks (the “mutual blocking” problem discussed below),27 transferring scarcity of
marks online to the offline world, where concern about the depletion of available new
marks has been expressed in recent years.
I. The Role of the International Trademark Conventions
The international trademark conventions contain little that is determinative on the
private international questions of jurisdiction, applicable law, or recognition of
judgments. The Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agreement (which incorporates and
builds upon the Paris Convention)28 each embodies three principal concepts: (i) signatory
states must provide minimum standards of substantive trademark protection;29 (ii) states
must offer protection on the basis of national treatment (i.e., accord the same protection
to citizens of foreign signatory states as they do to their own citizens);30 and (iii) national
trademark rights in one signatory country are independent of rights in other countries.31
The minimum standards in the Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agreement do not
directly address or affect any questions of private international law. National treatment
and the principle of independence of rights, which affirm in different ways and with
different strength the principle of territoriality,32 arguably do bear upon the question of
choice of law. But their significance in this regard should not be overstated. These
principles do not mandate any particular choice of law rule. The national treatment
principle in particular is often treated as instituting a choice of law rule (in both copyright
and trademark law).33 But, as the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has noted, in
the copyright context:

27

See infra text accompanying notes 137-41; see also Bettinger and Thum, supra note 26, at 290
(discussing “mutual blocking”). If the blocking is a result of a conscious effort to prevent expansion from
one geographic territory to another, national trademark laws may provide relief for the first producer. See
Persons Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Bettinger and Thum, supra note 26, at
288 n.67 (discussing cases under the German Unfair Competition Act).
28
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 2(1) (requiring compliance with the provisions of the Paris
Convention).
29
See Paris Convention, supra note 1, arts. 6bis-10ter; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 15-21.
30
See Paris Convention, supra note 1, arts. 2, 6(2); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 3.
31
See Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 6(3).
32
Cf. Walter J. Derenberg, Territorial Scope and Situs of Trademarks and Goodwill, 47 VA. L. REV. 733,
734 (1961) (noting the relationship between Paris Convention principles and the concept of territoriality).
33
See, e.g., Subafilms v. MGM-Pathe Comms., 24 F.3d 1088 1097 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc)
(acknowledging the accepted view that although copyright treaties do not discuss choice of law, “the
national treatment principle implicates a rule of territoriality,” and noting that “‘the applicable law is the
copyright law of the state in which the infringement occurred, not that of the state of which the author is a
national or in which the work was first published’” (citation omitted)); Creative Tech., Ltd. v. Aztech Sys.
PTE, Ltd., 61 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1995) (commenting that “national treatment and territoriality are
choice of law principles”); Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of
Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505, 543 & 547 (1997) (suggesting that the national treatment principle
implies a territorial approach to choice of law in trademark cases).
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[T]he principle of national treatment is really not a conflicts rule at all; it does not
direct application of the law of any country. It simply requires that the country in
which protection is claimed must treat foreign and domestic authors alike.
Whether U.S. copyright law directs U.S. courts to look to foreign or domestic
law as to certain issues is irrelevant to national treatment, so long as the scope of
protection would be extended equally to foreign and domestic authors.34

Moreover, choice of law methodologies may reflect that territoriality is an
underlying premise of the international conventions in a variety of ways. Traditionally,
U.S. courts affirmed a territorialist philosophy by resolving choice of law issues in tort
cases by application of the lex loci delicti. In recent years, however, most states in the
United States have rejected the inflexible application of the lex loci delicti in favor of a
policy-based approach to choice of law. But even within such a scheme, the territorialist
claims of the place of conduct and place of injury are afforded great significance.35 The
question of choice of law is taken up in more detail below in Part III.
II. Choice of Forum: Adjudicative Jurisdiction
In the United States, to hear a case, a court must possess personal jurisdiction over
the defendant and jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim. Although these
concepts may be expressed differently in other countries, the notion that there are
restrictions (grounded both in fairness to the parties and in the legitimate scope of forum
sovereignty) on the courts that may adjudicate a particular dispute is common to all
developed legal systems.36
A.

Jurisdiction over Non-resident Defendants

Jurisdictional analyses are essentially efforts to find a tie between the forum and
the defendant or the event in dispute between the parties. In the U.S. vernacular, personal
jurisdiction over the defendant may be specific or general. Where a defendant is subject
to the general jurisdiction of the court, the court may adjudicate a cause of action even if
that action did not arise out of or is not related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.
Specific jurisdiction allows the court to adjudicate only cases that arise out of or are
related to the contacts with the forum. Thus, a court that has general jurisdiction over the
defendant in a trademark action may adjudicate an infringement claim even if the
contacts that the defendant has with the forum are wholly unrelated to the alleged
trademark infringement. In contrast, if the court is relying upon specific jurisdiction over

34

Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 89 n.8 (2d Cir. 1998).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS, § 145 (1971).
36
Cf. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION GLOBAL CYBERSPACE JURISDICTION PROJECT, ACHIEVING LEGAL AND
BUSINESS ORDER IN CYBERSPACE: A REPORT ON GLOBAL JURISDICTION ISSUES CREATED BY THE
INTERNET, reprinted at 55 BUS. LAW. 1801, 1834 (2000) (suggesting that the results of jurisdictional
analysis in civil and common law systems are very similar even if the form in which the rules are stated is
different) [hereinafter, ABA JURISDICTION PROJECT].
35
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such a defendant, the conduct that is alleged to amount to trademark infringement must
itself be forum-related.37
Courts in the United States possess general jurisdiction over persons who engage
in “systematic and continuous contact with the forum.”38 Such jurisdiction, because it
subjects defendants to the adjudicative authority of a court with respect to any cause of
action, requires stronger contacts than those sufficient merely to found specific
jurisdiction. It is under the rubric of general jurisdiction that U.S. states exercise personal
jurisdiction over their own domiciliaries.39 General jurisdiction may also be founded on
the service of the defendant with process while voluntarily present in the forum. The
validity of this latter form of jurisdiction, sometimes referred to as “tag jurisdiction,” has
been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court.40
Jurisdiction in the courts of EU states in actions against European citizens is
governed by the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters.41 When it was concluded, the Brussels Convention
limited certain types of jurisdiction that prevailed theretofore in European countries.
French law, for example, historically permitted the assertion of jurisdiction in any case
brought by a French plaintiff.42 The Brussels Convention prohibits jurisdiction based
upon such a consideration in cases covered by the Convention (that is, cases brought
against domiciliaries of Convention states).43 The Convention also forbids jurisdiction
based upon tag jurisdiction,44 although it does permit courts to assert jurisdiction over
their own defendant domiciliaries based upon that contact alone.45

37

As discussed below in the context of the Shevill case, this distinction may be significant if courts wish to
consider the possibility of consolidating several related national claims of infringement as one means of
reducing the costs of national rights in an international era. See infra note 51. The practice in the United
States may deviate from the theory. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, An Alert to the Intellectual Property
Bar: The Hague Judgments Convention, __ U. ILL. L. REV. ___ (2001) (forthcoming) (copy on file with the
author) (manuscript at 7) (noting the practice of U.S. courts to hear all claims between the parties in order
to ensure efficiencies in litigation).
38
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
39
The attitudes of different countries, and states within the United States, to the different treatment of
residents, nationals, and domiciliaries is explored more fully in the ABA Jurisdiction Project report. See
ABA JURISDICTION PROJECT, supra note 36, at 1856-57.
40
See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
41
See Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept.
27, 1968, 1978 O.J. (L 304) 77, 78-83, 8 I.L.M. 229 (1969), amended by 1990 O.J. (C 189) 2, 3-9, 29
I.L.M. 1417 (1990). The parallel Lugano Convention extends the same principles to EFTA states. See
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16,
1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 1. The Brussels and Lugano Conventions are in the process of being (revised and)
incorporated into EU law. See Proposal for a Council Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, COM(1999) 348 final 3-4 (July 14, 1999);
Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, COM(2000) 689 final (October 26, 2000).
42
See Code Civil, art 14 (Fr.).
43
See Brussels Convention, supra note 41, art. 3.
44
See id.
45
See id., art. 2.

9

The rules of specific jurisdiction in the United States and the EU reveal less
obvious textual disagreement. In the United States, although the test for specific
jurisdiction over tort claims such as trademark infringement varies from state to state,46
under typical state long-arm statutes, jurisdiction over a trademark claim against a nonresident defendant normally exists in the courts of the state where the harm occurs.47 The
Brussels Convention similarly permits the assertion of jurisdiction over tort claims in the
place where the harm occurred.48
Trademark rights are aimed at protecting against two primary harms: the
confusion of consumers and diminution of the goodwill of the producer.49 Where do
these harms “occur” when trademarks are being used in the international marketplace?
Several possibilities come to mind. First, a place of conduct rule could be adopted: the
harm could be treated as occurring where the defendant “used” the mark without
authority. In most systems, the assertion of jurisdiction by courts of the state where the
allegedly tortious conduct occurred would be regarded as unobjectionable.
This first basis of jurisdiction would, if regarded as the exclusive place of harm,
subject non-resident defendants to the jurisdiction of the courts only where they conduct
business and use the mark. This restrictive basis of jurisdiction would facilitate the
establishment of rogue states (intellectual property havens) offering succor to infringers
of intellectual property. To be sure, the “place of conduct” could be expansively
interpreted to include “places” where the defendant is not physically present. Courts
have, for example, interpreted the unauthorized online posting of a copyrighted work as
involving the distribution of copies of the work in all places from which the work can be
accessed by the public.50
Such semantic straining is, however, unnecessary. A second basis for jurisdiction
could focus on where consumers – the unwitting victims of the unauthorized trademark
use – are based (and thus where injury arguably occurred). The European Court of
Justice has interpreted the Brussels Convention expansively as permitting the assertion of
jurisdiction both where the conduct giving rise to the tort occurred or where the harm
46

Although trademark law is primarily federal in the United States, federal courts apply the jurisdictional
rules of the states in which they are sitting. See Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 4. A recently enacted amendment to
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a federal court hearing a federal case, such as a claim
under the Lanham Act for trademark infringement, to assert jurisdiction based upon the aggregate of
contacts within the United States if the defendant “is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of general
jurisdiction of any state.” See id., Rule 4(k)(2).
47
There might be limited circumstances where federal constitutional standards would not permit the
assertion of jurisdiction in the place where the harm occurred. See, e.g., Worldwide Volkswagen v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); see also
Patrick J. Borchers, A Few Little Issues For The Hague Judgment Negotiations, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 157,
161-62 (1998). These gaps in jurisdiction flow in part from the constitutional focus on contacts between
the forum and the defendant rather than the forum and the events at issue.
48
See Brussels Convention, supra note 41, art. 5(3).
49
See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods., 514 U.S. 159, 163-164 (1995); Parfums Christian Dior v. Evora,
1997 E.T.M.R. 323, 336-38 (E.C.J. 1997).
50
See, e.g., National Football League v. TVRadioNow Corp., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1831, 1834-35 (W.D. Pa.
2000).
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impacted.51 Under Article 5, the Brussels Convention thus permits a court to assert
jurisdiction over a tort cause of action based upon extraterritorial conduct that causes
effects within the forum state.52 U.S. courts may also exercise jurisdiction where a
foreign defendant intentionally aimed his conduct at the forum state.53 For example, in a
domestic interstate trademark case claiming dilution via cybersquatting, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that jurisdiction was proper in a California (federal) court based
upon efforts by an Illinois defendant to register the trademark of a California-based
company as a domain name and sell it back to that company. Such conduct, concluded
the court, was intentionally directed at the State of California.54
Rather than focusing on consumers in identifying the place where the “harm
impacted,” one could as a third option look at where the plaintiff’s goodwill was harmed.
If goodwill were conceived of in simply financial terms, this harm would always
potentially occur at the home of the plaintiff (or where the plaintiff registered its mark).
Although this view has strong support in case law,55 relying upon place of incorporation
51

See Shevill v. Presse Alliance, S.A., 1995 E.C.R. 289 (E.C.J. 1995). The Shevill court permitted courts
vested with specific jurisdiction to grant damages only in respect of torts (in that case, libelous publication)
occurring within the forum state. In contrast, if the court were seized of general jurisdiction (for example,
if it were the place of the defendant’s domicile, the court would not be so confined. This illustrates the
advantages of general jurisdiction, although for the intellectual property plaintiff seeking broad relief it
might mean suing in the courts of the defendant. For an insightful critique of this decision, see Jane C.
Ginsburg, Private International Law Aspects of the Protection of Works and Objects of Related Rights
Transmitted Through Digital Networks 18-19, WIPO Doc. GCPIC/2 (Nov. 30, 1998), available at
http://www.wipo.int/eng/meetings/1998/gcpic/pdf/gpic_2.pdf.
52
The WIPO International Bureau has suggested that the place of act or place of injury would, in trademark
cases, be the same, namely, the loci protectionis. See Standing Committee on the Law of Trademarks,
Industrial Designs and Geographical Indications, Provisions of the Preliminary Draft Convention on
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters, WIPO Doc. No. SCT/4/3 (Dec. 20,
1999) at 3 (suggesting that this result flows from the territoriality of trademarks). But, as discussed more
fully below in the context of choice of law, this need not be the case. Where the defendant uses the mark
on a web site in one country that confuses consumers in another, the place of the act and place of injury are
discrete. The act may not be tortious in the country where the conduct occurred, and thus the act may be
actionable only under the laws of the latter; but the countries are distinct, and jurisdiction might
appropriately be founded in either.
53
See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3) (providing New York courts with long arm jurisdiction over tortious
acts outside New York that cause injury in New York); see also Robert-Gordon, LLC v. Superior Radiant
Prods., Ltd., 85 F. Supp.2d 202, 213-15 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (explaining why New York courts assert
jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(3) over non-residents alleged to have engaged in trademark infringement
via the use of plaintiff’s trademarks on a foreign web site).
54
See Panavision Int’l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding jurisdiction under the
California long-arm statute). For recent similar example, see Nutrisystem.com, Inc. v. Easthaven Ltd.,
2000 WL 1781924, __ F. Supp.2d __ (E.D.Pa. Nov. 16, 2000) (resting jurisdiction on phone calls and
emails to the plaintiff in the forum state offering to sell the domain name in dispute).
55
See, e.g., Euromarket Designs, Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd., 96 F. Supp.2d 824, 837 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
(asserting jurisdiction over an Irish defendant in a trademark infringement claim brought by an Illinois
plaintiff and noting that “the state of a company’s principal place of business is where the injury is most
likely to occur”). The Euromarket Designs court explained that the significance of the principal place of
business reflected the fact that it was the place where the trademark owner’s suppliers, vendors and
consumers would likely be based, as well as the place where the loss in revenues would be felt. See id.
And taken together these considerations clearly suggest that the injury was felt in Illinois. But it is not
clear that the claim is so strong when the only connection is place of incorporation (and hence where profits
were lost).
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alone might be too superficial a reading of the concept of goodwill (at least as presently
understood).56 The goodwill of the plaintiff within such a state will only be harmed if the
unauthorized use has an effect in that state (either by confusing consumers or by
tarnishing or blurring the distinctiveness of the mark). If the use is felt only in other
states, the separate goodwill in those states may be affected, but that should not be treated
as a harm occurring within the first state.57 Moreover, allowing jurisdiction on this basis
might effectively approximate jurisdiction on the exorbitant grounds of plaintiff
nationality found in French law but precluded by the Brussels Convention in actions
against Convention nationals. For purposes of personal jurisdiction, the focus of U.S.
constitutional analysis is on the defendant’s purposeful availment of the benefits of the
forum state. The plaintiff’s connection with the forum may be relevant as part of choice
of law analysis,58 but it should typically be given less weight in analysis of personal
jurisdiction.
Although jurisdictional rules at present are (with the exception of regional
agreements such as the Brussels or Lugano Conventions) the province of national laws,
with minimal international direction, globalization and the internet has made international
attention to jurisdictional issues essential.59 Accordingly, the Hague Conference on
Private International Law has in recent years been working on a Proposed Hague
Convention that would regulate jurisdiction in civil cases.60 The draft Hague Convention
addresses both jurisdiction and recognition of judgments: this is intended to permit a
compromise under which the European countries would liberalize their recognition
policies and the U.S. would limit its more expansive notions of jurisdiction.61 A
diplomatic conference to adopt the convention had been scheduled for late 2000, but the
United States indicated its unease with the current draft (which is closely modeled on the
Brussels Convention) and adoption has been delayed.62 A new Diplomatic Conference to

56

If the interest of the state of the plaintiff’s incorporation is framed in terms other than the preservation of
financial resources, its claim to assert jurisdiction as the place of injury might be stronger. For example,
Rochelle Dreyfuss has noted that “[s]ince one of the core interests in trademark law is encouraging the
maintenance of quality, the state where the trademark owner incorporated, or is centrally administered, or
maintains its principal place of business, is a reasonable and foreseeable forum to which to hale alleged
infringers.” Dreyfuss, supra note 37, at 33.
57
The strength of this argument will diminish as marks begin to develop universal goodwill based upon
common consumer understandings and unitary global marketing by producers.
58
See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (upholding the constitutionality of the application of
forum law in part based upon plaintiff’s post-accident residence in forum state).
59
See ABA JURISDICTION PROJECT, supra note 36, at 1820 (noting the “limited ability that any one state or
nation may have in bringing greater certainty to this area”).
60
See Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters (adopted by Special Commission on Oct. 30, 1999), available at
http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html.
61
For an analysis of the convention debate, see Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague
Treaty, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 89 (1999).
62
See Jeffrey D. Kovar, Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law, U.S. Department of State,
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the Committee on the Judiciary
of the House of Representatives (June 29, 2000) (describing major obstacles preventing immediate
conclusion of the Convention), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/kova0629.htm (last visited
Aug. 14, 2000).
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conclude the negotiations has been scheduled to begin in June 2001, with a final session
in early 2002.63
The Hague Convention process does, however, provide an attractive vehicle for
the consideration of many of these jurisdictional issues.64 At present, the draft
Convention would consolidate on a global basis most of the common grounds for
jurisdiction currently prevalent in both the United States and the EU. Thus a defendant
could be sued generally in the courts of the state where it is habitually resident.65 And a
plaintiff may bring an action in tort in the courts of the state where the act that caused the
injury occurred or in which the injury arose unless, in the latter case, the defendant could
not reasonably have foreseen that the act could result in an injury of the same nature in
that state.66 Jurisdiction based upon habitual residence is general; jurisdiction based upon
the tortious act or injury would, in U.S. terminology, be specific jurisdiction.67 The draft
Convention prohibits tag jurisdiction,68 jurisdiction based upon the nationality of the
plaintiff alone,69 or general jurisdiction based upon the defendant’s systematic and
continuous contacts with the forum (although these may contribute to specific jurisdiction
where the dispute is directly related to those activities).70
The development of consensus on the permissible exercise of adjudicative
jurisdiction would not only reduce (although not eliminate) litigation uncertainties for
international trademark actors.71 It would, perhaps more importantly, establish an
institutional framework in which national courts might be more willing to consolidate
disparate national claims in a single proceeding, as discussed below in Part II.C.72 And,
if recognition of judgments is linked to grounds of jurisdiction (as the current draft
proposes) it would offer international trademark owners more certain guarantees of
enforcement than can be provided in the current climate in which (especially as regards
online use) competing assertions of national sovereignty abound. This latter dimension
of the Hague Convention proposal is discussed in Part IV.

63

See United Patent and Trademark Office, Request for Comments on Preliminary Draft Convention on
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 65 Fed. Reg. 61306 (Oct. 17, 2000).
64
For a thorough analysis of all aspects of the Convention and the promise it holds for intellectual property
law, see Dreyfuss, supra note 37.
65
See Proposed Hague Convention, supra note 60, art. 3.
66
See id., art. 10.
67
See id., art. 10(4) (limiting jurisdiction in such cases to the causes of actions in respect of the injury that
occurred in the state).
68
See id., art. 18 (prohibiting tag jurisdiction).
69
See id. (prohibiting jurisdiction based upon the nationality of the defendant alone).
70
See id. art. 18(2)(e).
71
The European Court of Justice has jurisdiction to interpret the meaning of the Brussels Convention. No
such court will have a similar role with the Hague Convention. Uniformity will instead by pursued by
requiring national courts to interpret the Convention in light of its international character, the need for
uniformity, and the case law of other contracting states. See id. art. 38.
72
See generally Dreyfuss, supra note 37 (discussing values of consolidated intellectual property litigation).
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B.

Jurisdiction Based Upon Stream of Commerce Theories or Web Site Access

In the United States, the assertion of jurisdiction must also comply with federal
constitutional standards of due process. Some states explicitly provide that their longarm statutory bases for jurisdiction are coterminous with constitutional authority, but the
statutory grounds for jurisdiction may be less extensive than permitted by the
Constitution. The Due Process clause of the Constitution requires that the defendant have
“minimum contacts with the forum such that the exercise of jurisdiction would not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”73 These fundamental limits on
jurisdiction apply whether the defendant is a U.S. citizen or a foreign citizen. In contrast,
the limits that the Brussels Convention imposes on jurisdiction apply only where the
defendant is a domiciliary of a Convention state.74
Two particularly difficult, related jurisdictional questions (arguably arising under
this constitutional standard) are raised by modern international trademark practices.
First, if a producer places its goods in the “stream of commerce” and those goods
eventually reach a foreign state where they are alleged to infringe trademark rights, can
the producer be subject to the jurisdiction of that state? Second, and putting this first
question in a more specific context, can a person who uses an allegedly infringing
trademark on a web site (or in a domain name) be subject to the jurisdiction of courts in a
country where that web site is accessible by virtue of that “accessibility” alone?
On the more general question, the U.S. Supreme Court splintered badly when
asked to consider whether mere placement of a product in the stream of commerce might
meet the constitutional standard of due process. The Court split 4-4 on the question, and
Justice Stevens found it unnecessary to decide the question in the case presented to the
Court. 75 Lower courts thus remain divided on whether mere placement of a product in
the stream of commerce with awareness that the product might enter the forum state
constituted purposeful availment of the privilege of doing business in that state.76 (The
constitutional inquiry of minimum contacts in the United States will be treated as
satisfied if the defendant “purposefully availed itself” of the privileges of conducting
activities within the forum state.)
Answers to the second, more specific, question are also still being developed,
both in the United States and elsewhere. One way to address the new jurisdictional issues
73

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
74
The proposed Hague Convention applies in all actions in the courts of a contracting state unless all the
parties are habitually resident in that state. See Proposed Hague Convention, supra note 60, art. 2. The
provision vesting exclusive jurisdiction over various matters pertaining to industrial property rights in the
state conferring the rights, see id. art. 12(4), would apply even where all the parties are habitually resident
in the forum state. See id. art. 2(1)(b).
75
See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
76
For lower court responses to the Asahi Court’s opinions on the stream of commerce theory, compare
Rushton Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co., 9 F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir. 1993), and Dehmlow v. Austin
Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 1992), with Tobin v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods., 993 F.2d 528,
543 (6th Cir. 1993).
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presented by the internet would be to analogize online activity to offline conduct for
which we have developed jurisdictional rules.77 And the “stream of commerce” theory
still being debated in the United States may bear a superficial resemblance to the factual
premises of internet marketing using an unauthorized trademark. The foreign user, so the
argument goes, uses the mark on its web site knowing that that site will be accessed in
and thus be viewed in a wide range of states. By using the mark online, the user places
the mark in the stream of commerce such that it should be expected to be haled into
courts in any place from which the site is accessible.
Several lower courts in the United States have considered the question of whether
the mere accessibility of a web site in the forum will render the owner of the web site
susceptible to jurisdiction in that state. Most of these cases have involved internal U.S.
disputes, but the same principles would apply in the international setting.78 These courts
have thus far proved resistant to such arguments. As a general matter, despite an early
case to the contrary,79 the mere accessibility of a web site in the United States will be an
insufficient basis for personal jurisdiction.80 These cases include causes of action
alleging trademark infringement.81
If the mere accessibility of a web site were sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction, all persons with web sites would be subject to jurisdiction in courts of every
country.82 Instead, courts in the United States have focused in large part upon the web
site containing the allegedly infringing material is passive or interactive. Operating a
77

See, e.g., ABA JURISDICTION PROJECT, supra note 36, at 1811 (canvassing possible analogies); Draft
Provisions Concerning Protection of Trademarks and Other Distinctive Signs on the Internet, Standing
Committee on Trademarks, Industrial Signs and Geographical Indications, WIPO Doc. No. SCT/4/4 (Jan.
27, 2000) at 6 (suggesting analogies).
78
The development of in rem jurisdiction over certain claims of cybersquatting – one of the most
significant new trademark/internet claims – has reduced the pressure to test the limits of personal
jurisdiction in online trademark disputes involving domain names. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2). But such
claims (which are premised on the lack of in personam jurisdiction) can afford guidance by implication on
the likely attitude of courts to personal jurisdiction questions.
79
See Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996) (finding personal
jurisdiction over a defendant in trademark infringement action based upon the fact that the defendant had a
web site that used the plaintiff’s trademark, and concluding that “once posted on the Internet, unlike
television and radio advertising, the advertisement is available continuously to any Internet user [and the
defendant] has therefore purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in Connecticut”).
80
See generally Veronica M. Sanchez, Taking a Byte Out of Minimum Contacts: A Reasonable Exercise of
Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace Trademark Disputes, 46 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1571 (1999).
81
See, e.g., Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (rejecting jurisdiction
both under New York statutory grounds for jurisdiction and under constitutional standards of due process),
aff’d, 126 F.3d 25(2d Cir. 1997); People Solutions, Inc. v. People Solutions Inc., 2000 WL 1030619, __ F.
Supp.2d ___ (N.D. Tex. July 25, 2000).
82
See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 420 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that the mere operation of
a passive web site would be insufficient to found jurisdiction “otherwise every complaint arising out of
alleged trademark infringement on the Internet would automatically result in personal jurisdiction wherever
the plaintiff’s principal place of business is located”). Indeed, the jurisdictional picture painted by the
Cybersell court if such a contact were of itself sufficient demonstrates how close such an approach would
be to the exorbitant form of jurisdiction practiced by the French courts in favor of French citizens and now
prohibited by the Brussels Convention. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43 (discussing French
jurisdictional rules).
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purely passive web site is insufficient in and of itself; the case law is still forming on how
interactive a site must be to approach the other end of the spectrum where jurisdiction
would be proper.83
Trademark (and copyright) claims based upon unauthorized use of a mark (or
work) on a foreign web site have been upheld by U.S. courts. But none of these cases
creates any significant deviation from the proposition above regarding personal
jurisdiction. In Playboy v. Chuckleberry,84 for example, the defendant was already
subject to the personal jurisdiction of the U.S. court by virtue of an earlier court
proceeding (the case proceeded as a motion for contempt of the prior injunctive order).
And in National Football League v. TVRadioNow, the corporate officers of the defendant
were resident in the district in the United States in which the proceedings were brought,
there was substantial organizational and marketing activity by the corporate defendant in
that district, and there was evidence (based upon the number of hits and the nature of the
programming) that the defendant had targeted the United States.85
Courts in Europe have also considered this question. In France, for example, in
SG2 v. Brokat Informationssysteme GmbH,86 a French trademark holder sought an
injunction against the allegedly infringing use of its registered French mark on a German
web site. The German defendant owned the same mark for the same goods and services
in Germany, and used the mark only on its German web site (brokat.de). Although the
German defendant had never sold its goods in France (and indeed could not do so
because of French cryptography regulations) and used the mark only on a German site,
the Nanterre Court of Appeals assumed jurisdiction over the defendant under Article 5(3)
of the Brussels Convention. Because the German web site was accessible from France,
83

See, e.g., Mink v. AAA Development LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999); Euromarket Designs, Inc.
v. Crate & Barrel Ltd., 96 F. Supp.2d 824, 837-38 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 952
F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997). The Zippo court identified a spectrum of situations. “At one end of
the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does business over the Internet [in which case
personal jurisdiction is proper] . . . At the opposite end are situations where a defendant has simply posted
information on an Internet web site which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions, [a passive web site,
which does not of itself justify personal jurisdiction]. . .The middle ground is occupied by interactive web
sites where a user can exchange information with the host computer. In these cases, the exercise of
jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of
information that occurs on the Web site.” Id. Some courts have found an interactive site insufficient in and
of itself if in fact there was no accessing of the site from the forum. See, e.g., People Solutions, Inc. v.
People Solutions Inc., 2000 WL 1030619, __ F. Supp.2d ___ (N.D. Tex. July 25, 2000) (interactive web
site insufficient to found jurisdiction because although the web site had the potential to interact with Texas
residents no such interaction had taken place); Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music L.P., 33 F.
Supp. 2d 907 (D.Or. 1999); Rothschild Berry Farm v. Serendipity Group LLC, 84 F. Supp. 2d 904 (S.D.
Ohio 1999). Indeed, some courts have apparently given great weight to the number of “hits” that a site
experiences, see, e.g., Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996), although the
source of hits may be unreflective of the physical location of the user accessing the site.
84
See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
85
See National Football League v. TVRadioNow Corp., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1831, 1834-35 (W.D. Pa. 2000)
(holding that where defendants originated the streaming of copyrighted programming over the internet from
a web site in Canada, public performances occurred in the United States because users in the United States
could access the web site and receive and view the defendants’ streaming of the copyrighted material).
86
See SG2 v. Brokat Informationssysteme Gmbh, Nanterre Court of Appeals, October 13, 1996, discussed
in Bettinger & Thum, supra note 19, at 166-67.
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an infringement had occurred in France within the meaning of Article 5(3). Although the
Court’s injunction against internet use had effects beyond France – indeed, it had effects
in Germany where the defendant owned the trademark registration – the Court held that it
would enter what effectively was, in the internet context, a geographically unlimited
injunction because otherwise the rights of the French trademark owner in France would
go unprotected.87
Scholars have criticized the assertion of jurisdiction in cases such as SG2 and
have suggested that jurisdiction must be based upon something more than mere
accessibility.88 German scholars have suggested that the use must be “purposely
directed” at the forum for jurisdiction to be proper.89 And the ABA Cyberspace
Jurisdiction Project Report recommended that jurisdiction should exist only where the
web site use “targets” the forum. An example of targeting can be seen in Euromarket
Designs, Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd., where a federal court asserted personal jurisdiction
over an Irish-based web site that was alleged to be infringing plaintiff’s trademark where
the web site sold products priced in U.S. dollars and requested shipping and billing
information that included “state” and “zip code” fields.90 Both the ABA Cyberspace
Jurisdiction Project and the developing scholarship have advanced standards that are
similar to the concept of “purposeful availment” found in U.S. constitutional standards.
As a matter of private international law, more than one court may be able to assert
jurisdiction over the same dispute. But some limits must be established lest
extraterritorial extrusions of national adjudicatory jurisdiction (and the prescriptive
jurisdiction that is likely to follow) cause burdensome over-regulation of the internet.91
The inquiry being pursued by courts and scholars in the United States and scholars in
Germany – namely, what conduct in addition to the mere availability of a web site
warrants the assertion of jurisdiction – thus appears an essential one if the internet is to
flourish as a medium of global communication. Moreover, although the recent ABA
Cyberspace Jurisdiction Project Report concluded that “to date, apparently no other
country has focused on the degree of a site’s interactivity in assessing jurisdiction”92 it
may be that some of the developments in European scholarship suggest a growing
87

The French courts have adopted an assertive approach to jurisdiction in internet-related cases in areas
other than trademark law. Most notable in this regard is the recent high-profile case involving the sale of
Nazi memorabilia, in violation of French but not U.S. law, on the U.S. web site operated by Yahoo! See
Association Union des Étudiants Juifs de France, la Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisémitisme v. Yahoo!
Inc. et Yahoo France, T.G.I. Paris, Ordonnance de référé du 22 mai 2000,
http://www.legalis.net/jnet/decisions/responsabilite/ord_tgi-paris_220500.htm.; Interim Court Order of
November 22, 2000, http://www.cdt.org/speech/001120yahoofrance.pdf. The French authorities are not
alone in seeking to apply national laws to foreign web sites; several nations have indicated an intent to
extend their domestic laws to foreign online activities that are accessible to persons in those nations.
88
See ABA JURISDICTION PROJECT, supra note 36, at 1820, 1828; Dan Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28
CONN. L. REV. 1095, 1111 n.70 (1996) (criticizing Inset as “absurd”); Bettinger and Thum, supra note 19,
at 169-70.
89
See Bettinger and Thum, supra note 19, at 170 n. 18 (listing scholars).
90
See Euromarket Designs, Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd., 96 F. Supp.2d 824, 829 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
91
See Playboy Enters. v. Chucklberry Pub., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1039-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting the
danger for the development of the internet of over-aggressive assertions of jurisdiction).
92
ABA JURISDICTION PROJECT, supra note 36, at 1855.
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consensus. That is, something more than mere accessibility in a state of a passive web
site that is not aimed at that state should be insufficient to establish jurisdiction,93 while
the effort by an actor to target a particular jurisdiction will subject the actor to the
personal jurisdiction of that state.94
C.

Jurisdiction Over Claims Under Foreign Trademark Laws

In addition to personal jurisdiction, courts must also have jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a claim. In the context of trademark claims, this issue is often
intertwined with other elements of private international analysis. In particular, subject
matter jurisdiction is often subsumed within a court’s analysis of applicable law. In
theory, the question of jurisdiction is analytically distinct from the question of which law
courts will apply. That a court may hear a case does not mean that it may (or should)
apply its own law to resolve the controversy that it adjudicates. Courts may thus assume
jurisdiction over a dispute even if the plaintiff’s claims are to be determined under a
foreign law.95
But the practice is quite different.96 Indeed, U.S. federal courts hearing federal
causes of action generally (not just trademark claims) frequently blend analysis of subject
matter jurisdiction and prescriptive jurisdiction. In the United States, most trademark
infringement claims are brought under the (federal) Lanham Act and are heard in federal
court.97 The federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction over most trademark claims rests
93

The ABA Jurisdiction Project suggests that jurisdiction, both personal and prescriptive, should exist in a
state not only where the defendant is a habitual resident of that state but also where the defendant internet
user targets that state or if the dispute arises out of a web site that, although not targeted at the state, is
interactive and the defendant can be fairly considered knowingly to engage in business transactions there.
See id., at 1821.
94
Id. at 1827-28.
95
As a matter of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, a state that is properly
seized of adjudicative jurisdiction is precluded from failing to hear a case simply because it involves
application of the law of another state. See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951). But Hughes should not
be read too absolutely. It has not been regarded as an obstacle to a court declining to exercise jurisdiction,
for example, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, where judicial ease of applying the applicable
law may clearly be considered. Moreover, because Hughes is rooted in the Full Faith and Credit Clause, it
would not as a constitutional matter prevent a U.S. court from declining to exercise jurisdiction on the
grounds that the case would involve the application of the law of another country. The Full Faith and
Credit Clause does not require states (or the United States) to give any degree of similar faith and credit to
the laws of a foreign country. Cf. Boosey & Hawkes Music Pub. Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481 (2d
Cir. 1998) (cautioning against declining jurisdiction on forum non conveniens grounds in a copyright case
merely because adjudicating the case would involve the application of foreign laws).
96
See JAMES J. FAWCETT AND PAUL TORREMANS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW 4 (1998). Intellectual property claims thus fit within what Andreas Lowenfeld called the “public law
taboo.” See Philip J. McConnaughay, Reviving the “Public Law Taboo” in International Conflict of Laws,
35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 255 (1999) (identifying Professor Lowenfeld as the source of the phrase); ANDREAS F.
LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR REASONABLENESS: ESSAYS IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-5 (1996) (discussing reluctance of courts to apply foreign laws in certain areas
perceived as implicating “public law”).
97
Whereas patent and copyright claims in the United States are reserved exclusively to the federal courts,
and to federal law, state trademark protection exists concurrently with federal protection, and claims may
be heard in state or federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
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upon their adjudicating a claim under the Lanham Act, which in turn rests upon the
Lanham Act (i.e., U.S. law) being chosen as the applicable law. If the court decides that
a trademark infringement claim should not be decided under U.S. law, then the courts
will dismiss the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the claim does not
“arise under federal law.”
The existence of a federal question is not the only basis, however, upon which the
federal courts may have jurisdiction over the subject matter of a claim. For example, a
claim that does not arise under federal law may also be heard by federal courts if the
parties are of diverse citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.98 Thus,
although federal courts have historically treated federal copyright claims in much the
same way as trademark claims, in recent years, U.S. federal courts have been willing to
entertain claims under foreign copyright laws, relying on alternative bases of subject
matter jurisdiction such as diversity of citizenship or pendent (supplemental)
jurisdiction.99 Indeed, the Second Circuit in a copyright case cautioned against declining
jurisdiction merely because adjudicating the case would involve the application of
foreign laws.100 The theory underlying these cases is that copyright is a transitory cause
of action that can be litigated in any courts that have personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.101
The U.S. courts were not alone in exhibiting a reluctance to hear claims of foreign
copyright infringement.102 Recently, however, courts in Europe have also been willing to
hear foreign copyright claims, based upon the liberal jurisdictional provisions of the
Brussels Convention, and to revisit the historical notion that intellectual property
infringement is a local cause of action.103 Moreover, in several cases European
(primarily, but not exclusively, Dutch) courts have used the “multiple defendants”
98

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
See Carell v. Shubert Org., 104 F. Supp. 2d 236, 257-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (permitting claims based on
foreign copyright laws to proceed notwithstanding the plaintiff’s failure to specify in her complaint the
particular countries under whose laws the claims were made); Armstrong v. Virgin Records, Ltd., 91 F.
Supp. 2d 628, 637-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (entertaining claims based on unspecified foreign copyright laws on
the basis of diversity jurisdiction and pendent jurisdiction); Frink America, Inc. v. Champion Road Mach.,
Ltd., 961 F. Supp. 398, 402-05 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (declining to dismiss claim under Canadian copyright
law); London Film Prods. v. Intercont’l Communications, 580 F. Supp. 47, 49-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(agreeing to hear claims under several foreign copyright laws). But see ITSI T.V. Prods., Inc. v. California
Auth. of Racing Fairs, 785 F. Supp. 854, 866 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (declining to enter the “bramble bush” of
foreign copyright law), rev’d on other grounds, ITSI T.V. Prods., Inc. v. Agric. Ass’n, 3 F.3d 1289 (9th
Cir. 1993).
100
See Boosey & Hawkes Music Pub. Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998).
101
See London Film, 580 F. Supp. at 50.
102
For example, the majority of U.K. courts (and courts from other British Commonwealth countries) had
been reluctant to adjudicate claims of foreign intellectual property infringement. The reasons were
numerous, and given effect in both jurisdictional and choice of law rules. As a jurisdictional matter,
intellectual property actions were treated as local causes of action, to be litigated only where fictionally
situated. As a matter of choice of law, foreign intellectual property claims failed the so-called “double
actionability rule.” See G.W. Austin, The Infringement of Foreign Intellectual Property Rights, 113 LAW
QUART. REV. 321 (1997).
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See Pearce v. Ove Arup P’ship, [1999] 1 All E.R. 769, 784-804 (C.A. 1999) (hearing claim for
infringement of Dutch copyright).
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provision in Article 6 of the Brussels Convention104 to consolidate national claims and
grant pan-European relief based upon a collection of domestic and foreign (national)
patent and trademark rights.105 And broader geographic relief for trademark infringement
can also be achieved in Europe through the Community Trade Mark (CTM). The holder
of a CTM may, in certain circumstances, obtain EU-wide relief in national courts (sitting
as “CTM Courts”). CTM courts have exclusive jurisdiction in all actions for
infringement, declaration of non-infringement, or counterclaim for revocation or
declaration of invalidity of, the CTM.106 If the jurisdiction of the CTM court107 is based
upon domicile or establishment of the defendant (or the plaintiff), the CTM owner may
obtain injunctive relief across the EU.108 If the jurisdiction of the court rests instead upon
alleged infringement in the member state in which the CTM court sits, then jurisdiction
exists only over those acts of infringement and thus relief may extend only to the borders
of the member state involved.109 When national courts are sitting as CTM courts,
however, they will be applying the substantive law of the EU Regulation rather than the
104

Article 6(1) provides simply that “a person domiciled in a contracting state may be used where he is one
of a number of defendants in the courts of the place where any one of them is domiciled.” Brussels
Convention, supra note 41, art. 6(1). The European Court of Justice has, however, interpreted Article 6(1)
to be subject to a requirement that the claims against the multiple defendants be related. See Kalfelis v.
Schroder, Case 189/87, [1988] ECR 5565 (drawing the requirement of relatedness from the language of
Article 21-22). The ability of this provision to act as a vehicle for plaintiffs seeking cross-border relief
depends in large part upon the degree of connection or relatedness that courts demand under a reading of
Kalfelis. See Expandable Grafts P’ship v. Boston Scientific BV, 1999 F.S.R. 352 (Ct. App. 1999)
(Netherlands) (rejecting previously accepted argument that sufficient connection may be grounded on the
infringement of national patents derived from a common European patent application). It is also affected
by judicial attitudes to the interaction between the broad grants of jurisdiction in Articles 2, 5 and 6, and the
exclusive jurisdiction provision in Article 16(4). See infra note 118 (citing case law on this question).
105
Most of the leading cases involved patent rights (typically national patent rights stemming from a
common European patent), although some cases involved trademark claims. See, e.g., Yakult v. Danone,
1998 E.T.M.R. 465, 472 & 479 (Hague Dist. Ct. 1998) (“The system under the Brussels Convention
requires that the Court, even the “own” court referred to in Article 2, must apply foreign trade mark law in
the appropriate cases” but declining to extend the injunction to France “although competent to do so”
because of a lack of urgency); see also Sven A. Klos, Cross-Border Injunctions in EU Trademark and
Patent Litigation, Paper Presented to the Sixth Annual Fordham Conference on International Intellectual
Property Law and Policy (April 1998) (copy on file with author). The literature addressing these
developments is voluminous. For a good background discussion of the pertinent provisions and case law,
see Ian Karet, Intellectual Property Litigation – Jurisdiction in Europe, 3 I.P.Q. 317 (1998). To some
extent, the Dutch courts have restricted the availability of pan-EU relief in more recent cases by
interpreting the requirement of relatedeness of claims more strictly. See Expandable Grafts P’ship v.
Boston Scientific BV, 1999 F.S.R. 352 (Ct. App. 1999) (Netherlands). For commentary on this more
recent case law and the so-called “spider in the web” doctrine developed by the Dutch courts, see Charles
Gielen, District Court Refines Case Law on ‘Spider in the Web’ Doctrine, 14 World Intell. Prop. Rep. 186
(June 2000) (suggesting that little new case law has developed since Expandable Grafts but discussing case
law on the extension of the doctrine to cases involving non-European defendants).
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See EU Trademark Regulation, supra note 6, arts. 91-92.
107
Under Article 93, actions may be brought in the state where the defendant is domiciled or, if the
defendant is not an EU domiciliary, in the state in which the defendant has an establishment. If the
defendant lacks either such connection, then the action can be filed in the state where the plaintiff is
domiciled or, if the plaintiff is not an EU domiciliary, in the state in which the plaintiff has an
establishment. If the plaintiff also lacks either such connection, the action may be brought in Alicante,
Spain (home of the Community Trademark Office). See id., art. 93.
108
See id. art. 94(1).
109
See id. arts. 93(5), 94(2).
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national, Trademark Directive-consistent trademark law of the state in which they sit, and
they will be enforcing supranational EU-wide trademark rights.110 Thus the relief in
CTM proceedings is strictly still being sought in the courts (and under the law) of the
country, or rather union of countries, conferring the rights.
A similar spate of cases applying foreign law cannot be found in the trademark (as
opposed to copyright) context in the United States, however, where a conclusion that a
foreign law should apply still largely results in the dismissal of the case.111 What
justification might there be for this difference, and does it support a continuing reluctance
to adjudicate foreign trademark claims? In part, the paucity of cases applying foreign
trademark law in the United States might reflect a lack of need. Whereas the U.S. courts
have in the last six years become increasingly cautious about the extraterritorial
application of U.S. copyright law, courts have expressed a greater willingness to apply
U.S. trademark law extraterritorially.112
Another explanation for the different approach in trademark cases can be
discerned from the reasons given by courts for exercising such jurisdiction in the
copyright context. Trademark claims are a less attractive target for adjudication by a
foreign court because many (but not all) trademark rights are registered. The hesitation
to entangle courts in the review of foreign registered intellectual property rights is seen in
a number of instruments of private international law that otherwise make liberal provision
for assertion of jurisdiction in international litigation. For example, although the recently
adopted EU E-Commerce Directive excluded intellectual property rights generally
(including copyright) from the scope of its conflicts provisions,113 the Brussels
Convention, the proposed Hague Convention, and the proposed EU Regulation on
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Certain matters are left to national law, such as rules of procedure, and remedies for infringement other
than injunctions. See id., arts. 97-99, 101.
111
See Vanity Fair Mills v. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956) (dismissing case where plaintiff
declined to separate Canadian claims from U.S. claims). For a recent example, see Alcar Group v.
Corporate Performance Sys., Ltd., 109 F. Supp.2d 948, 952 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (dismissing Lanham Act
claims notwithstanding the existence of alienage jurisdiction and noting that “if [the plaintiff] has a
trademark case, it is under British, German or other EC law.”). There are limited instances where U.S.
courts have not dismissed a claim based upon foreign trademark or unfair competition law. For example, in
Bravo Co. v. Chum, 60 F. Supp.2d 52 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), the American plaintiff brought an action against its
Canadian licensee as a result of use of the mark in Canada that was alleged to be in breach of the license
agreement. The plaintiff’s complaint included claims for passing off under Canadian law. The court
denied a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds notwithstanding that some of the claims arose
under Canadian law. The defendant had invoked Vanity Fair, and its concern in particular about
interference with foreign official acts. The court rejected those arguments, noting that the defendant had
(despite its own application for the BRAVO mark in Canada) contractually acknowledged the plaintiff
licensor as the owner of the mark in Canada and that the claims essentially involved interpretation of
contractual rights. See id. at 60. The Court was also comforted by the fact that there was no allegation that
Canadian law was different from U.S. law. See id. at 61 n.6.
112
See Bradley, supra note 33, at 526; Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Aeropower Co., 34 F.3d 246, 248-49 (4th
Cir. 1994) (comparing the extraterritorial scope of the trademark and copyright statutes).
113
See Council Directive 2000/31/EC on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in
Particular, Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 O.J. (L 178), art. 3(3) & Annex (noting the
fields not covered by the Directive).
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Jurisdiction all carve out only certain issues relating to registered industrial property
rights from the scope of their operation.114
The Brussels Convention reserves issues regarding the validity of registered
industrial property rights to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the state that
granted the rights.115 The scope of the registered industrial property exclusion in the
proposed Hague Convention is still being debated. At its narrowest, it may be limited to
challenges to the validity of registered rights.116 But some countries have suggested that
the exclusive jurisdiction provision should be extended to infringement questions on the
theory that the scope of rights (and hence determinations of infringement) are linked to
validity; a restrictive approach to one might justify an expansive approach to the other,
and vice-versa.117
If national courts adopt the approach to this issue that found favor with some
European courts under the Brussels Convention, 118 the practical significance of the scope
of the exclusive jurisdiction provision may not be huge.119 Once a reservation is made
for challenges to validity, the defendant should not find it difficult to remove an
infringement claim to within the protective confines of the “validity” exclusion by
interposing a defense based upon invalidity of rights.120 The more fundamental debate,
114

See Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, COM(2000)689 final (Oct. 26, 2000), art. 22(4).
115
See Brussels Convention, supra note 41, art. 16(4).
116
As with the Brussels Convention and developing judicial practice in the United States, the proposed
Hague Convention would impose no exclusive jurisdiction rule on copyright cases.
117
See Dreyfuss, supra note 37, at 23; see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Federalized Functionalism: A New
Approach to Design Protection in the European Union, 25 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N Q.J. 611, 625
n.123 (1996) (discussing linkage between scope of rights and threshold for protectability).
118
See Fort Dodge Animal Health v. Akzo Nobel, 1998 F.S.R. 222 (Ct. App. 1997) (Eng.); Coin Controls
Ltd. v. Suzo International (UK) Ltd., [1997] 3 All ER 45 (Ch. D. 1997) (Eng) (interpreting Article 19 of the
Brussels Convention to require foreign court to decline jurisdiction when issues of validity over which
another national court had exclusive jurisdiction were implicated and noting that “in some patent
infringement proceedings it is really only validity which is in dispute”); see also Ian Karet, Suit, Anti-Suit:
Cross-Border Skirmishing in Fort Dodge v. Azko, 19 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 76 (1998) (discussing Fort
Dodge and Coin Controls and noting reference to the European Court of Justice). For a discussion of
strategic litigation alternatives, see Vincenzo Jandoli, The “Italian Torpedo”, 31 I.I.C. 783, 788 (2000)
(discussing pre-emptive actions for declarations of non-infringement).
119
The introductory language of the exclusive jurisdiction provision in the draft Hague Convention may
restrict such broad interpretations. It demarcates the scope of exclusive jurisdiction by referring to
“proceedings which have as their object the registration, validity” etc. of registered rights. See Proposed
Hague Convention, supra note 60, art. 12(4). In contrast, Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention vested
exclusive jurisdiction “in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity” of registered industrial
property rights. See Brussels Convention, supra note 41, art. 16(4) (emphasis added); see also Coin
Controls, [1997] 3 All E.R. at 45 (noting that Jenard report indicated an intent to exclude from Article 16(4)
“incidental” issues of validity but concluding that because the challenge to patent validity in infringement
proceedings was “a major feature of the litigation” it could not be “incidental and is therefore a matter with
which the action is principally concerned”). The broad reading given to Article 16(4), see supra note 118,
might thus be avoided in the Hague context by the narrower language in the preceding the list of issues
(such as validity or infringement) with respect to which exclusive jurisdiction exists.
120
The Jenard report that is one of two reports treated as the official history of and interpretive guide to the
Brussels Convention explicitly suggested that Article 16(4) of that Convention was intended to distinguish
between actions for infringement and actions challenging validity. See Jenard Report, 1979 O.J. C59, 1,
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therefore, is whether we need to reassess the traditional reluctance to adjudicate claims
implicating the validity of foreign registered industrial property rights.
The registration variable is said to be significant for several reasons, including
respect for foreign administrative officials and concerns of institutional competence.
First, it is argued that registered rights, such as trademark rights, are more likely directly
to implicate decisions of the administrative organs of a state.121 Courts are generally
reluctant to pass on the correctness of the governmental acts of a foreign state.122 But it is
not clear that the application of foreign trademark law would be any more offensive to a
foreign state than the wholesale extraterritorial application of U.S. law, which U.S. courts
are clearly willing to contemplate in the trademark context (albeit only after consideration
of likely conflict with foreign trademark rights).123
According exclusive jurisdiction to the conferring state on matters implicating
validity or nullity of registered rights also reflects the concern of some countries
regarding the ability of foreign judges to make judgments regarding the validity of
registered rights, which are normally granted only after detailed administrative
examination by specially trained national officials.124 But the objection regarding the
capacity of the judiciary to make determinations of validity applies with greater force to
patent rights than trademark rights. To be sure, trademark rights in certain countries are
conditioned on examination. But in many countries examination is cursory, and the trend
is clearly toward less rigorous examination of trademark registration applications.125
Finally, the basic concepts of trademark law are common to most countries (even if there
remain differences in the application of those rules).
If states remain concerned that foreign judges would be assessing the validity of
national registered rights, the res judicata effect of such a foreign judgment on validity
36. But the interjection of a defense that implicated validity was sufficient to convince some U.K. courts
that the exclusive jurisdiction provision had been triggered, requiring deference to the courts with that
jurisdiction. See Fort Dodge Animal Health v. Akzo Nobel, 1998 F.S.R. 222 (Ct. App. 1997) (Eng.)
(“when there is a bona fide challenge to the validity of a United Kingdom patent, any proceedings for
infringement must in English eyes be ‘concerned with’ the validity of the patent”). It may be that the
different language in the draft Hague Convention, see supra note 112, may reduce the strength of the link
between Article 12(4) and an infringement action in which validity is raised. But this is a thin reed upon
which to rest. See Dreyfuss, supra note 37, at 24 n.101(discussing current draft of Article 12(4) and
suggesting revision if consolidation of national litigation is endorsed as a goal). Indeed, even if national
courts limit Article 12(4) strictly to validity proceedings, it may (depending upon the interpretation of lis
pendens and forum non conveniens rules) simply force the defendant to bring an action, where available,
challenging validity in the court vested with exclusive jurisdiction. This multiplicity of proceedings is
hardly a recipe for efficient multinational litigation.
121
See London Film Prods. v. Intercont’l Communications, 580 F. Supp. 47, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) MELVILLE
B. NIMMER AND DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 17.03 (1999).
122
See Bradley, supra note 33, at 581 (discussing values underlying the act of state doctrine).
123
See infra text accompanying notes 176-87 (discussing extraterritoriality case law).
124
See Dreyfuss, supra note 37, at 22-23.
125
The Community Trade Mark Office (the OHIM), for example, examines only for absolute grounds for
denial of registration. See EU Trademark Regulation, supra note 6, arts. 7, 38. Relative grounds are left to
inter partes proceedings, although a specialized opposition division has been established within the Office
to adjudicate the oppositions filed. See id., arts. 8, 42-43.
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could be restricted to the parties to the foreign litigation.126 Alternatively, an additional
exception could be created to the rules on recognition and enforcement of judgments that
would permit member states with what might be called “primary jurisdiction,” that is,
those with “exclusive jurisdiction” under the current draft, to revisit de novo the question
of validity.127
Other reasons support revising the exclusive jurisdiction provision of the
proposed Hague Convention. In some countries (most notably, the United States),
trademark rights may exist without registration of the mark, but rather are based upon the
use of the mark in commerce as a source-identifier.128 And in other countries, unfair
competition laws effectively institute a parallel system of unregistered trademark
protection (even if such protection might not be denominated as such in all countries).129
If registration is conceived as a dividing line of significance in determining whether to
assume jurisdiction over foreign infringement claims,130 the treatment of such composite
bodies of intellectual property protection under private international law may become
unduly fragmented.
Moreover, if the exclusive jurisdiction provision is adopted without revision,
efforts to litigate questions involving trademark rights granted by several states in a
single proceeding might be frustrated. Forcing intellectual property owners to pursue
their rights in serial national proceedings is a serious threat to effective enforcement of
rights.131 Consolidation of claims in a single proceeding would facilitate full
enforcement of national rights in an international era, and would conserve the judicial
resources that would otherwise be involved in serial national litigation.132 To be sure, the
126

In a forthcoming article, Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss highlights several difficulties of such a proposal,
and helpfully offers some variants that might address those problems. See Dreyfuss, supra note 37, at 2526. Professor Dreyfuss also suggests that the concern could be addressed by instituting a reference
procedure to the courts of exclusive jurisdiction on issues of validity. See id. at 24-25; cf. Coin Controls
Ltd. v. Suzo International (UK) Ltd., [1997] 3 All ER 45 (Ch. D. 1997) (Eng) (discussing possibility of
different national courts determining validity and infringement).
127
This would be functionally similar to one of the variants of the inter partes restriction that has been
suggested by Rochelle Dreyfuss. See Dreyfuss, supra note 37, at 25-26 (suggesting that a losing right
holder be able to vacate an inter partes determination of invalidity if the court of exclusive jurisdiction
holds it valid in subsequent litigation).
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See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (protecting unregistered marks).
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Trademarks are not unique in this respect. For example, design rights may be registered or unregistered.
Indeed, the design protection scheme conceived by the European Commission (and already partly
implemented) would grant unregistered and (stronger) registered rights to the same universe of designs,
deliberately treating the unregistered form of protection as a transition to the acquisition of registered
rights. See Dinwoodie, supra note 117.
130
The focus on registration might encourage a plaintiff to bring a claim in the United States under Section
43(a) rather than under Section 32, which is the basis for actions alleging infringement of registered rights.
There is little substantive difference between the elements of the two causes of action, and the litigation
advantages of registration in the United States are now relatively few.
131
See Euromarket Designs, Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd., 96 F. Supp.2d 824, 843 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (noting
that the U.S. plaintiff was pursuing an Irish-based web site alleged to have infringed its trademarks in
separate proceedings in Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United States).
132
Indeed, the successful litigants in one national proceeding may be unable to take advantage of issue or
claim preclusion doctrines. See Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 126 F.3d 365, 371-72 (2d Cir. 1997)
(rejecting a motion for an antisuit injunction preventing the plaintiff from pursuing claims in France for
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streamlining of international intellectual property litigation will depend upon more than
the ability to consolidate several national claims in a single proceeding;133 the judicious
use by national courts of forum non conveniens and lis pendens powers will, for example,
also be important.134 But a broadly read exclusive jurisdiction provision would of itself
hinder any streamlining of international industrial property litigation.
Finally, because the ability of a national court applying a single national law to
grant effectively global injunctions against certain internet use is raising concerns
generally,135 the prospect of consolidated international litigation (whether under a series
of national laws or under a single international rule) may be perceived as less antagonistic
to foreign interests and more likely to draw international support. That is, the
consolidation of claims that would be facilitated by revision of the exclusive jurisdiction
provision would provide national courts operating within an international environment
with greater flexibility to accommodate the divergent interests of a number of interested
states. Policymakers should thus consider how to empower courts to hear claims that
implicate trademark laws other than those enacted by its own legislature.136
III. Choice of Law
Once a court has jurisdiction over a trademark dispute involving contacts with
several countries, the forum has to decide which law should apply to decide the dispute.
More than one state may have a plausible claim to apply its law (i.e., to exercise
prescriptive or legislative jurisdiction). The forum might consider applying a trademark
law other than its own to determine the effect of the unauthorized or contested use of a
mark in international commerce. And the law applicable to determine the
validity/existence of trademark rights may be different from that used to determine
questions of ownership or infringement. Before exploring in Parts C through J below the
different strategies for determining the applicable law (or minimizing the difficulties

infringement of its French copyright notwithstanding that the defendant had prevailed when similar claims
had been brought under U.S. copyright law in a U.S. court).
133
The extent to which consolidation will occur will in turn depend in large part upon the scope given to
the multiple defendants’ provision. See Proposed Hague Convention, supra note 41, art. 14. The breadth
of the parallel (although slightly different) provision in the Brussels Convention (Article 6) has, in addition
to the exclusive jurisdiction provision, been central to the availability of EU-wide relief under that
Convention. See Klos, supra note 105. The likelihood of widespread consolidation might also depend
upon the extent to which the substantive national laws to be applied have been harmonized. Cf. Yakult v.
Danone, 1998 E.T.M.R. 465, 472-73 (Hague Dist. Ct. 1998).
134
The proposed Hague Convention contains a lis pendens provision that would require suspension in
certain circumstances and permit it in others. See Proposed Hague Convention, supra note 60, arts. 21-22.
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See Keith Perine, Yahoo Asks U.S. Courts to Rule French Court of Bounds, The Standard, Dec. 21,
2000, at http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,21026.00.html (last visited January 3, 2001).
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Accord Pamela E. Kraver and Robert E. Purcell, Application of the Lanham Act to Extraterritorial
Activities: Trend Toward Universality or Imperialism?, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 115 (1995).
The most persuasive defenses of territorialism in contemporary intellectual property law have been offered
by two scholars willing to countenance the application of foreign laws. See Graeme W. Austin, Domestic
Laws and Foreign Rights: Choice of Law in Transnational Copyright Infringement Litigation, 23 COLUM.V.L.A. J.L. & ARTS 1 (1999); Bradley, supra note 33. They implicitly recognize that, absent such a
willingness, the territorialist system that they support appears less practical in our global society.
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associated with that choice), I address some preliminary points regarding the choice of
law dilemma in modern trademark law.
A. Effect of the Ubiquity of the Internet on Strategic Policy Choices
Courts in several countries have adopted expansive interpretations of the reach of
domestic trademark rights in the online context. For example, some courts have reasoned
that the accessibility in their country of a foreign web site that contains trademarks
involves use of those marks in their country.137 If there were widespread adoption of the
principle that prescriptive jurisdiction of a particular country can be premised upon the
mere accessibility of a web site in that country, then a producer would require to clear its
trademark use in every country of the world. With respect to future marks, this would
significantly increase the cost of trademarks, and hence of goods to consumers. It would
convert truly local uses into global uses, giving rise to innumerable conflicts, causing the
depletion of available marks, and eviscerating the concept of local use through which
trademark law has facilitated co-existence of marks in the past.
With respect to existing marks, this might cause producers currently operating
offline with legitimately acquired trademark rights from expanding into the online
environment lest they interfere with competing rights in other countries. As suggested
above, one might view this merely as akin to the inability to expand globally into other
geographic markets where competing mark ownership exists. But in this context, the
inability to expand online effectively regulates domestic conduct (where the producer
owns the trademark) as well as the foreign market (where some other party owns the
mark). The foreign mark ownership thus effectively regulates the producer’s use in the
domestic market where the producer has rights, highlighting the extraterritorial effects
that will flow from broad trademark rights, and broad assertions of adjudicative and
prescriptive jurisdiction, in this context. All that the domestic producer acquires through
ownership of the domestic rights is the corresponding capacity (assuming that the courts
where the domestic producer owns rights are similarly intrusive) to prevent the foreign
producer from using its legitimate foreign rights online for its own domestic purposes.
Trademark rights are thus reduced to their most destructive form, namely, a mutual
ability to undermine the sales efforts of competitors in other countries by blocking certain
commercially significant uses. This “mutual blocking” capacity is neither efficient nor a
positive contribution to the globalization of markets or the development of ecommerce.
It may be that this impasse might give rise to privately negotiated settlements
among the parties to the dilemma, with the assignment of global rights being made to a
137

See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (enjoining
the use of a term on a web site in Italy where use of that term was permitted by Italian law, because the web
site could be accessed from the United States where the use in question would be a trademark
infringement); SG2, supra (granting the motion of a French trademark holder to enjoin the use of the same
mark by its lawful German trademark holder on the web site of the German mark owner in Germany);
Concert-Concept, Berlin Court of Appeals 1997 CR 685 (holding that the accessibility in Germany of a
U.S. site with a domain name comprising a term in which another party owned the German trademark
rights amounted to an infringement of that other party’s German trademark rights). For a discussion of the
German and French cases, see Bettinger & Thum, supra notes 19 & 26, at 166-67, 289.
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single producer. Such private ordering has its own costs. It greatly enhances the costs of
the respective producers; the parties have already incurred the costs of acquiring rights
and must now make further payments to exercise fully the rights they acquired. Perhaps,
one may view this negotiation as the means by which rights are acquired for a new
“territory,” namely cyberspace, just as one has to acquire rights to new offline territories
in which expansion occurs. That is, the private negotiation and buy-out costs might be
regarded as the cyberequivalent of trademark acquisition costs (whether acquiring from
the trademark authorities in that new territory, or buying out the existing trademark
owners in that territory). But here, that cost will be immense. One cannot merely expand
into a single territory. To be fully assured of no other blocking marks, rights must be
acquired in every country that grants rights, or will in the future grant rights. Indeed, the
competing mark owner with rights in a single jurisdiction can offer little of value because
it cannot guarantee cyberexclusivity unless it owns the same mark in all other countries
of the world.138
The problem is arguably exacerbated by “first to register” systems. “First to
register” remains the prevailing rule of priority in the vast majority of national systems.139
If a “first to use” priority rule were adopted globally, and use of a mark on the internet
were treated as use sufficient to acquire rights in all places where that site were
accessible, then this problem would be significantly reduced. Indeed, the costs of
trademark acquisition would be reduced from those that pertain at present; use in
commerce on the internet would potentially give rise to global trademark rights on the
cheapest basis possible. (It would not give rise to rights in countries where the term
would not be regarded as inherently distinctive, which may vary from country to country
based upon linguistic and other comprehension. But even in countries where no exclusive
trademark rights were acquired, the producer would be able to continue use along with
others because the disability of non-distinctiveness would also undermine the claims of
competitors to exclusive rights.140). Of course, this approach would run counter to the
trend, found in both national and international laws, away from use-based rights.
Moreover, supporters of use-based systems tout such systems as limits on excessively
easy trademark grants rather than means of facilitating broader acquisition of rights.
Indeed, recent WIPO SCT proposals on the question of use on the internet reflect
concerns that use be given a more restricted rather than a more extensive meaning in the
online environment. Finally, an approach that permitted producers to employ “use” as an
international acquisition strategy also raises other substantive trademark problems. In
particular, the grant of rights throughout the world on the basis of internet use alone
would result in a speedier depletion of terms that could be used for trademark purposes,
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This mirrors problems that the EU will have to face with regard to its Community Trademark when the
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for the Community Trademark System, 19 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 185 (1997).
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See Daniel C. Schulte, The Madrid Trademark Agreement’s Basis in Registration-Based Systems: Does
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goods and thus be off limits to our producer because of broad dilution rights accorded the first producer.
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and may come close to effecting a single geographic market for trademark purposes.
These may be costs that one thinks too high to bear.141
B. The Most Novel Problems in Trademark Choice of Law
In the copyright context, there has been recent scholarly and judicial discussion of
which law should determine the ownership of copyrighted works; national laws may
differ as to the person regarded as the author or initial owner of the work (e.g., the
employee, or to her employer under the work for hire doctrine).142 The predominant and
more troublesome choice of law question to which copyright scholars have turned
attention, however, has been which law should determine whether the conduct in question
was infringement or authorized by law. The exceptions and limitations to copyright
found in national law vary in detail from state to state.143 Of course, as suggested above,
choice of law issues may arise from different laws regarding the scope of trademark
rights or applicable defenses.144 And the application of the same legal rules to different
factual circumstances pertaining in different countries might also give rise to different
results and hence choice of law issues.145 But with trademark law, the most novel
problem is likely to be competing claims of ownership rather than disparate national
approaches to the scope of rights or meaning of infringement. This is not a conflict of
legal rules regarding ownership of marks; rather it is a conflict in international markets
between two persons with undisputed legitimate ownership of different national
properties.146 Competing ownership may partly be a result of different laws – perhaps, a
priority rule based upon first to use versus one based upon registration – but it is more
problematically a factual question of different persons satisfying the same test in different
countries.
141

In recent years (through dilution laws, and some domain-name based case law and legislation),
trademark owners have been granted plenary trademark rights across product markets; this approach would
combine that expansion with plenary control across geographic markets.
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See supra text accompanying note 13.
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939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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C.

Technological Solutions

One strategy, which may also mesh with recent developments in copyright law
and practice, is to use technology to resolve the problems caused by technology. Is
technologically imposed territorialization appropriate? If it is, what can the law do to
provide appropriate support for those efforts?147 A technological solution might, for
example, require persons selling goods on the internet to ensure that their web sites could
not be accessed from countries where their use of the mark in question would be an
infringement of the rights of another party.148
In the United States, the Playboy v. Chuckleberry court sought to impose a
territorially defined injunction by ordering the defendant to adopt the technological
measures necessary to prevent U.S. access to the web site containing the infringing
trademark.149 Similarly, in the recent Yahoo auction access litigation in France, the grant
of relief was dependent upon a report by court-appointed experts on the feasibility of
filtering out French users from those persons accessing the U.S. site that infringed French
law.150 The ABA Global Jurisdiction project also endorses the use of technological
measures to prevent territorial spillover by insulating defendants that make good faith
efforts to prevent access to a web site by users from a particular state from assertions of
jurisdiction by that state.151
The technological approach is, however, difficult practically,152 would greatly
increase costs and might undermine the benefits that the internet has created.153 Although
the use of technological measures might be considered as part of a remedy in appropriate
147

The parallel here is the set of rules, adopted internationally in the WIPO Copyright Treaty and
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technological access-restrict and copy-protect measures adopted by copyright owners to protect their
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n.25 (2000) (discussing the costs of technological reterritorialization in the context of copyright law).
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circumstances, the benefits of the low cost barriers to entry on the internet, the capacity
of the internet to bridge national divides, and the limited effectiveness of technological
measures, means that technological re-territorialization of the internet should not be the
primary means of addressing these private international issues. The potential benefits of
the internet warrant a search for other or complementary solutions.
D.

Conventional Wisdom: Lex Loci Protectionis

National courts decide applicable law largely unconstrained by international
intellectual property conventions, partly because those conventions are mostly not selfexecuting, but also because the Conventions say little about choice of law.154 The Berne
Convention contains provisions that guide, though hardly determine, choice of law
analysis with respect to certain copyright issues.155 But neither the Paris Convention nor
the TRIPS Agreement provides any detailed guidance in matters of trademark law. As
noted above, those agreements are premised upon principles of national treatment and
independence of national rights. Neither principle requires any particular choice of law
rule; national treatment requires only that nationals of a foreign signatory state receive
equivalent protection as that granted domestic mark owners; independence of rights
requires only that a trademark granted in a Paris member state is not affected by the status
of any registration for the same mark for the same goods that may exist in other member
states.
But both these basic principles affirm the notion of territoriality, and this has been
read as grounding a choice of law rule of lex loci protectionis. 156 Unlike copyright,
where the text of the Berne Convention adverts (in some manner) to such a rule, the rule
in trademark law is said to flow from the territoriality of trademark rights.157 This is
endorsed by scholars and courts as the conventional rule in intellectual property generally
(at least in questions of infringement) and is the prevailing rule in trademark law. The
question of whether trademark rights exist, and whether infringement has occurred, is
largely determined by the law of the country in respect of which protection is claimed.
But if the principle of territoriality has guided the development of conflicts
principles in trademark law it has also stunted them. Courts have never sought to
reconcile different trademark laws or competing trademark rights, or to articulate the
basis upon which to prefer the prescriptive claim of one state over another. Instead, they
simply recognize forum-determined rights and apply forum law or, alternatively, dismiss
the case if it does not implicate such rights or laws. In an era of international commerce,
154
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where consumer understanding, product markets, and producer marketing, disdain
territorialism, the value of such a rule as the lodestar for international trademark law
becomes questionable. The internet renders it impractical. Moreover, the principle of the
independence of rights enshrined in the Paris Convention is itself subject to exceptions
that modify the territoriality premise. The protection for well-known marks found in
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, affirmed and extended by Article 16 of the TRIPS
Agreement, and developed further by the recent resolution approved by the WIPO
Assembly,158 is the most notable example.159
Some scholars have decried any effort to develop a conflicts rule proper that
departs from the lex loci protectionis.160 But recent copyright literature is replete with
efforts to consider just such a question. Why should trademark be far behind?
E.

New Conceptual Choice of Law Rules

The acceptance of the lex loci protectionis as the choice of law rule for
infringement of intellectual property rights means that the place of alleged infringement
determines any claim.161 But this is less helpful in the internet context because “if an
activity occurs in cyberspace, it is impossible to ascribe it to any specific physical
space.”162 Nor does it explicitly address the most significant choice of law problem in
trademark law, namely the problem of competing ownership claims. Finally, fictionally
localizing an activity that is inherently non-local also detaches the applicable law from
social reality, which undermines its legitimacy.163
But fictional localization through legal rules, though difficult, might be preferable
to technological localization discussed above because it would preserve the social gains
generated by the borderlessness of the internet.164 Thus, we should consider how courts
might localize online use of trademarks such that a traditional approach to choice of law
problems could be used. And the conceptual difficulty of “placing” the harm can be
lessened if one focuses not on where a single act of conduct (e.g., “use”) occurs165 but
instead on where the trademark-relevant effects of that conduct are felt. Indeed, this
transition from place of conduct to place of effects reflects an evolution in private
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international law thinking that occurred decades ago.166 Thus refocused, our analysis
might, as suggested above in the context of jurisdiction,167 ask where consumers were
confused,168 or where was the goodwill of the trademark owner threatened? But the
answer to these questions may be “everywhere,” which is hardly more helpful.
Another alternative to asking the relatively metaphysical question of where an
online trademark infringement “occurs” would be to adopt a choice-of-law rule
pragmatically designating a fixed locus for the tort. Such localization can be performed
with a variety of values in mind: the localizing rule might be designed to further
trademark values, to further “conflicts values” such as reducing forum-shopping, or to
facilitate e-commerce. But the leading pragmatic options suggest that this task may also
have practical problems. If the place where the defendant is based, or the place of
unauthorized upload of the mark, or the place of server hosting the web site upon which
the unauthorized use was made, is selected, the law of that place is exported
extraterritorially to other countries. (To some extent, of course, this is a danger with any
choice of law rule that applies a single law to multistate events.). This might not only
conflict with the policy choices of those other states, whose consumers or markets may
be affected by the unauthorized use, but might also increase the risk of encouraging
trademark havens (countries where trademark enforcement is lax). Conversely, it may
constrain legitimate uses in those countries for no justifiable reasons: the allegedly
infringing mark might not confuse consumers there (perhaps because of different patterns
of use or different consumer practices).
On the other hand, a choice of law rule that designates the place where consumers
accessed the web site allows consumers to dictate the trademark rules that are to govern
the mark user’s conduct in its own country. The extraterritorial effects are simply
reversed. This criticism loses some of its force, however, if the unauthorized foreign user
of a mark has targeted and intentionally engaged with the person who accessed the web
site where the mark is used. The concept of targeting or purposeful availment found in
U.S. jurisdictional analysis might thus be usefully deployed here as a choice of law
principle.169
If conceptual localization of the online use is the approach to be adopted, use in
one country targeted exclusively or primarily at another country should vest prescriptive
jurisdiction in the targeted state. To use a non-trademark example, in the last few months
166
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an Austrian web site was established to facilitate the selling of votes in the U.S.
Presidential election. The site violated U.S. law. Although the site and its operators were
not present in the United States, the site was targeted exclusively at, and most directly
affected the interests of, the United States. Even were the site pursued in non-U.S.
courts, the claim of U.S. law to be applied is strong.170
F. Unilateral Interpretation of Extraterritorial Scope
In the United States, choice of law analysis in trademark cases has largely taken
the form of different tests of extraterritorial scope. That is, courts faced with an
allegation that a set of facts partly involving foreign commerce gives rise to a trademark
infringement claim concentrate on the unilateral question whether the U.S. Lanham Act
should apply extraterritorially. If the answer is in the affirmative, then the U.S.
trademark statute (and that alone) is applied, and the courts are seized of federal question
jurisdiction over the dispute. If the answer were in the negative, the court dismisses the
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction: the case does not arise under the federal laws
of the United States.171
U.S. courts do not always pursue such a “scope-oriented” unilateralist approach to
choice of law in international cases. In torts cases generally, many courts (state and
federal) have been willing to consider and mediate the competing prescriptive claims of
interested states. For example, in international cases involving maritime claims, the U.S.
Supreme Court has in the past determined the applicable law using methods that resemble
modern policy-based choice of law analysis.172 In recent times, however, the Court has
resolved choices between federal law (such as antitrust law) and the law of a foreign
country by engaging in a bare assessment of whether Congress intended the federal law
in question to apply extraterritorially. For example, in Hartford Fire v. California,173 the
majority of the Supreme Court restricted its analysis to whether the U.S. Congress meant
U.S. antitrust law to apply to conduct in the United Kingdom that was intended to have
effects in the United States. Finding such congressional intent, the majority applied U.S.
antitrust law and rejected the approach of Justice Scalia, who argued that the application
of U.S. antitrust law should be considered in light of the flexible principles of private
international law found in the Restatement of Foreign Relations.174
This raises a fundamental private international law question: in an international
trademark dispute, should the question of applicable law be determined by courts
attempting to weigh the claims of competing states using precepts of private international
law, or should a forum court simply determine whether a given set of facts involves
extraterritorial application of the law and whether its legislature intended to apply its law
170
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extraterritorially (possibly aided by canons of statutory construction such as a
presumption against extraterritoriality)?175 At present, the U.S. courts predominantly
follow the latter approach. As a result of this unilateralist philosophy, choice of law
jurisprudence in trademark cases remains underdeveloped.
Since the enactment of the modern trademark statute, the Lanham Act, in 1946,
the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the extraterritorial application of trademark law on
only one occasion. In Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.,176 the defendant (Steele, who was an
American citizen) owned the mark BULOVA for watches in Mexico; the plaintiff owned
the mark in the United States. The defendant assembled inexpensive watches in Mexico,
marked them with the BULOVA name and sold the watches in Mexico. When some of
the watches crossed the border into the United States, the plaintiff sued under the Lanham
Act to enjoin the defendant’s conduct. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to apply the
Lanham Act to the defendant’s conduct. In its opinion, the Court stressed three facts
supporting its conclusion: (i) the defendant was an American citizen, and Congress had
broad power to legislate with respect to the conduct of American citizens; (ii) effects of
the defendant’s conduct were felt in the United States, where some of the infringing
watched were sold, and where Bulova Watch received complaints from unsatisfied
customers; and (iii) by the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the Mexican
registration owned by Steele had been canceled.
Although the Court did not indicate which, if any, of these considerations –
defendant’s citizenship, effects on U.S. commerce, and lack of conflict with foreign
trademark rights – were essential to the extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act to
the defendant’s use of the Bulova mark in Mexico, later (lower) courts have further
developed these factors and their significance. But since Bulova, different “tests of
extraterritoriality” have been used by different U.S. courts177 to determine whether the
Lanham Act should apply to a set of facts with foreign or international elements.178 The
two most prominent tests are those used by the Second Circuit, on the one hand, and by
the Ninth Circuit, on the other hand.179
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In the Second Circuit, the courts still determine whether the Lanham Act should
be applied extraterritorially by application of the Bulova factors.180 In Vanity Fair Mills
v. Eaton,181 where the Second Circuit first distilled the three factors from the Bulova
decision, the court suggested that the Lanham Act would not be applied extraterritorially
if two of the three factors were absent. (Indeed, the Vanity Fair court hinted that the
presence of all three factors might be necessary to justify extraterritorial application).182
Thus, in that case, the Court refused to apply the Lanham Act where the American owner
of a U.S. trademark registration sought to restrain the use of the mark in Canada by a
Canadian defendant that owned the Canadian registration for the same mark. Although
the defendant’s use had a substantial effect on U.S. commerce, the defendant was not a
U.S. citizen and was the legitimate owner of the mark under Canadian law.
The Second Circuit has generally adhered to the Bulova factors as the framework
in which to determine whether to apply the Lanham Act extraterritorially to international
trademark disputes. In so doing, it has (until very recently) been reluctant to apply the
Lanham Act absent at least two of the Bulova factors and has required a “substantial
effect” on U.S. commerce before finding the “effects” factor satisfied.183 Indeed, even in
some of its recent more liberal decisions, discussed more fully below, the court has
insisted that district courts analyze the question in the framework of the Bulova factors.184
The Ninth Circuit has adopted a slightly more liberal attitude to the extraterritorial
application of the Lanham Act, and has instead applied the test for extraterritorial
application of federal laws that it first developed in the antitrust context.185 Under that
test, “there are three criteria that must be considered: (1) there must be some effect on
American foreign commerce; (2) the effect must be sufficiently great to present a
cognizable injury to plaintiffs under the federal statute; (3) the interest of and links to
American foreign commerce must be sufficiently strong in relation to those of other
is, of the assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction – have generally been quite lax in the internal U.S. context.
See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). Although the court’s analysis in Hague was
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rights under the Due Process Clause. See Home Ins. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). The same limits would
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international law, or the law of nations, may impose limits on prescriptive jurisdiction, it is presumed that
the U.S. Congress has not transgressed those limits, see Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64
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nations.”186 The third factor is analyzed using seven sub-factors, which include the
nationality of the parties and the degree of conflict with foreign law (i.e., two factors that
are similar to, but broader than, the other Bulova factors).187
Although the Ninth Circuit test resembles the Second Circuit test, especially when
these two additional considerations under the third factor are figured in, the other subfactors relevant to whether “the interest of and links to American foreign commerce must
be sufficiently strong in relation to those of other nations” instruct courts expressly to
weigh the nature and significance of respective foreign and U.S. interests. Its focus is, in
this regard, therefore more in line with the analytical focus of modern policy-based
approaches to choice of law in the United States. Like the Second Circuit Bulova factors
analysis, however, the Ninth Circuit test does not instruct how the different factors are to
be weighed.188 The Ninth Circuit test would, however, appear more receptive (if largely
because of its flexibility) to the extraterritorial application of U.S. law.
The standards for extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act have been read
liberally, particularly outside the Second Circuit.189 For example, the statute has been
186

Ocean Garden Inc. v. Marktrade Co., Inc., 953 F.2d 500, 503 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Star-Kist Foods,
Inc. v. P.J. Rhodes & Co., 769 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also Reebok Int’l, Ltd. v. Manatech
Enters., Inc., 970 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1992).
187
See Ocean Garden, 953 F.2d at 503. The Bulova factors require focus on the defendant’s citizenship,
and assess conflicts with foreign trademark rights. See infra notes 192 (noting focus of Ninth Circuit on
plaintiff’s nationality) and 201 (noting Second Circuit articulation of third Bulova factor as conflicts with
foreign “trademark rights”). The full list of factors considered in the Ninth Circuit in assessing this third
question is: (1) degree of conflict with foreign law; (2) nationality of the parties; (3) extent to which
enforcement is expected to achieve compliance; (4) relative significance of effects on U.S. as compared to
elsewhere; (5) whether the explicit purpose is to harm U.S. commerce; (6) the foreseeability of such effect;
and (7) the relative importance of violations within the U.S. as opposed to the conduct abroad.
188
Indeed, the principal criticism of balancing test approaches to the question of extraterritoriality is that it
tends to give the courts (and future litigants) little guidance. See Bradley, supra note 33, at 555-56.
Professor Bradley thus advocates what he calls a “categorical” approach, under which courts would strictly
apply a presumption against extraterritoriality (thus forcing Congress clearly to articulate the circumstances
in which it wished to apply U.S. law). Professor Bradley concedes that this approach risks being both
underinclusive and overinclusive with respect to avoiding conflicts with foreign nations, but sees this as a
worthwhile (and inevitable) costs of rules over case-by-case balancing factors. See id. at 556. But the
number of trademark cases in which there is now an arguable extraterritorial effect is so great, especially
online, that this may effectively be a judicial retreat from the playing field. Professor Bradley, at a different
part of his analysis, appears receptive to the argument that some statutes may by the nature of what they
regulate, have extraterritorial effects and application. See id. at 567 (discussing suggestion by Larry
Kramer). International trademark practices, and especially the internet, may now support the inclusion of
trademark within these exceptional circumstances, compare id. at 568 (discussing the inherently
international nature of admiralty law, and the broad economic purpose of antitrust law), although Professor
Bradley rejected such an argument in 1997. See id. at 569. In the end, a willingness to apply something
other than purely U.S. law, see supra text accompanying notes 128-36, may make the extraterritoriality
question less significant as such.
189
Courts outside the Second Circuit have generally articulated the extent of the required effect on U.S.
commerce in more easily satisfied terms. Thus, for example, although the Second Circuit has stressed the
need for a “substantial” effect on U.S. commerce, see, e.g., Totalplan Corp. of Am. v. Colborne, 14 F.3d
824, 830 (2d Cir. 1994), the Fifth Circuit has required the lesser showing of “some effect.” See American
Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Coop. Ass’n, 701 F.2d 408, 414 n.8 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Nintendo
of Am., Inc. v. Aeropower Co., 34 F.3d 246, 250-51 (4th Cir. 1994) (“significant effect”).
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applied in cases where there was no sale of goods bearing the unauthorized mark, no
likely consumer confusion, and no diversion of sales, within the United States.190 In
some cases in the Ninth Circuit, the principal consideration appears to have been the
nationality of the parties (and, strangely, the American nationality of the plaintiff in
particular).191 The Eleventh Circuit has accepted the movement of goods through free
trade zones in the United States as sufficient effect on commerce to implicate U.S.
interests.192 Courts in that Circuit have also asserted jurisdiction over foreign effects
based upon supporting or preparatory conduct in the United States.193
In recent years, some lower (district) courts in the Second Circuit have been more
receptive to the extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act, especially where
American defendants are involved. For example, in Aerogroup Int’l Inc. v. Marlboro
Footworks, Ltd.,194 a district court applied the Lanham Act to sales of infringing products
in Canada by an American defendant (who had admittedly not applied for trademark
rights in Canada) even though the evidence regarding effect on U.S. commerce was
“equivocal”. But the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has been resistant to a
broad-based relaxation of the Bulova factors. In Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Arco Globus
Int’l Co.,195 the Court refused to apply the U.S. statute to foreign conduct despite the
American citizenship of the defendant and there being no conflict with foreign trademark
rights because of the lack of any effect on U.S. commerce. The court found no evidence
that the goods would enter the United States,196 or that there was likely consumer
confusion in the United States, or that the plaintiff’s reputation in the United States would
suffer, and stressed that the Second Circuit has “never applied the Lanham Act to
extraterritorial conduct absent a substantial effect on United States commerce.”197
The Second Circuit has, however, been willing to relax the standards for
extraterritorial application in circumstances where the plaintiff was seeking something
less than an absolute injunction. For example, in Sterling Drug v. Bayer, the Second
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See, e.g., Ocean Garden Inc. v. Marktrade Co., Inc., 953 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1991); American Rice, Inc. v.
Arkansas Rice Growers Coop. Ass’n, 701 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1983).
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See, e.g., Ocean Garden, 953 F.2d at. 504 (continually raising the plaintiff’s Californian citizenship in
assessing the relevant factors under the Ninth Circuit test).
192
See Babbit Elecs., Inc. v. Dynascan Corp., 38 F.3d 1161, 1179 (11th Cir. 1994).
193
See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading, Inc., 51 F.3d 982 (11th Cir. 1995). The Second Circuit
would probably not accept such conduct alone, without some effect in the United States, as substantial
effect on U.S. commerce. See Totalplan Corp. of Am. v. Colborne, 14 F.3d 824 (2d Cir. 1994). But see
Piccoli A/S v. Calvin Klein Jeanswear Co., 19 F. Supp.2d 157, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (suggesting that
language in the Second Circuit decision in Atlantic Richfield leaves open the possibility that the Lanham
Act may be applied where the defendant makes use of the physical stream of U.S. commerce in a way that
is essential to alleged infringement even where no goods are sold in the United States and no American
consumers are mislead).
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955 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, 152 F.3d 948 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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150 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 1998).
196
Cf. Fun-Damental Too v. Gemmy Corp., 111 F.3d 993 (2d Cir. 1997) (applying U.S. law to foreign
conduct by a U.S. defendant where the goods upon which unauthorized use was made were designated for
shipment to the United States).
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Atlantic Richfield, 150 F.3d at 192 n.4. See also Totalplan Corp, 14 F.3d at 830 (refusing to apply the
Lanham Act where there was no evidence that the shipment of goods abroad from the United States
affected U.S. commerce by re-entering the country and causing confusion).
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Circuit, consistent with Vanity Fair, vacated the district court’s grant of an injunction
with extraterritorial consequences because the lower court failed to consider the Bulova
factors.198 But the Court provided guidance to the district court (which that court was to
consider on remand) that indicates a relaxation of the Bulova factors as understood in
Vanity Fair. The defendant, Bayer AG, was a German company that owned rights to the
BAYER mark in most countries of the world, but not in the United States. The U.S.
rights were owned by the plaintiff, Sterling, a U.S. company. Strictly, any effort to apply
the Lanham Act to uses occurring outside the United States would fail the Bulova test:
the defendant was German, and any such injunction would interfere with the defendant’s
legitimate foreign trademark rights. But the Second Circuit suggested that where the
plaintiff was seeking “the more modest goal of limiting foreign uses that reach the United
States” rather than a blanket injunction against any use by the defendant, the unrefined
application of the Bulova/Vanity Fair factors was unnecessarily demanding and would
undermine the purposes of U.S. trademark law, namely to protect U.S. consumers against
confusion.199
Similarly, in Playboy v. Chuckleberry, the court applied U.S. law (as embodied in
an earlier order adjudging infringement) to the use by the Italian defendant of the
plaintiff’s mark on a web site in Italy that was permitted by Italian law (because the
plaintiff’s mark was unprotectable in Italy).200 The district court recognized that it could
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See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer, 14 F.3d 733 (2d Cir. 1994).
This focus on effectuating the purposes of the substantive trademark law has been used on other
occasions to justify more liberal assertions of prescriptive jurisdiction. See, e.g., Libbey Glass, Inc. v.
Oneida Ltd., 61 F. Supp.2d 720, 723 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (“stringent application of the Vanity Fair test is
inappropriate where . . .a defendant could unjustly ‘evade the thrust of the laws of the United States in a
privileged sanctuary beyond our borders’”) (citation omitted).
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See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). A routine
application of the Bulova factors to the facts in Playboy would have been only slightly more favorable to
the extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act than the facts facing the Second Circuit in Sterling Drug.
Although the defendant in Playboy was Italian, the accessibility of the web site in the United States could
be argued to have some, but perhaps not substantial, effect on U.S. commerce. See supra text
accompanying notes 88-94 (criticizing efforts to base adjudicative jurisdiction on mere accessibility of a
web site in the forum). Finally, although the defendant had no exclusive trademark rights of its own under
foreign laws, the plaintiff had made efforts to enforce trademark rights in Italy and had failed. See Playboy
Enters., 939 F. Supp. at 1034 (noting that the Italian courts denied PLAYBOY trademark protection
because the mark was descriptive and hence weak). One could interpret that decision as a determination by
the Italian authorities to allow the free use of the PLAYBOY mark, with which an extraterritorial assertion
of U.S. law would conflict. This merely highlights the lack of flexibility inherent in the Bulova factors,
which focus only on the existence of “trademark rights” not on the non-exclusive right of the defendant to
use the mark. See Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 642 (articulating third Bulova factor as whether there was a
“conflict with trademark rights established under foreign law); cf. LibbeyGlass, Inc., 61 F. Supp.2d at 723
(“because [the Turkish defendant] has not shown a registration under Turkish law, there is no evidence to
support the proposition that Turkey has an interest in this litigation that conflicts with the application of the
Lanham Act”). Compare Ocean Garden, 953 F.2d at 503-04 (listing “conflict with foreign law” as the
relevant consideration under the Ninth Circuit test, but suggesting that absent “pending proceedings”
abroad there would be no affront to a foreign nation’s sovereignty). It is not clear why the review of an
administrative act granting a registration would cause offense to a foreign nation, but an official (judicial)
act denying a registration (which might involve more detailed analysis of the issue of validity) is to be
ignored. Cf. American Rice, 701 F.2d at 415-16 (“Absent a determination by the [foreign] court that [the
defendant] has a legal right to use the marks, and that those marks do not infringe [the plaintiffs] mark, we
are unable to conclude that it would be an affront to [the foreign country's] sovereignty or law [to apply
199

38

not prohibit the defendant from operating its web site in Italy merely because the site was
accessible from the United States, where the use of the mark was prohibited. But the
court was willing to enter a more limited injunction requiring the defendant to stop access
to U.S. users who, by accessing the site from the United States, would effectively be
causing the use of the mark to filter into the United States.
The approach in Sterling Drug, where the Second Circuit felt compelled to relax
its long-standing test, merely highlights the need for more flexible analytical tools. The
Vanity Fair factors are too blunt in a more global society to accommodate the nuance of
international uses. 201 Almost every international trademark dispute may touch upon the
interests of more than one state. Sterling Drug suggests that, as discussed more fully
below, the resolution of the complexities of international trademark litigation may require
both a willingness to consider foreign laws and also an acceptance that national
trademark owners might have to settle for something less than exclusive rights when they
move into the international market.202 Indeed, implicit in the Second Circuit’s opinion is
recognition of the relationship between the nature of relief granted and undue interference
with the decisions of foreign states. Less extensive relief than a blanket injunction
enabled the federal U.S. courts to act without offending German sensibilities.
Les Ballets Trockadero de Monte Carlo v. Trevino203 highlights another
dimension of contemporary trademark law that might generate more liberal
extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act even in courts in the Second Circuit. In
particular, it demonstrates how substantive trademark reforms – protection against
dilution – may permit more expansive assertions of prescriptive jurisdiction. There, the
court enjoined the use of a mark in connection with the performance of entertainment
services in Japan where the defendant was a U.S. citizen and its pending Japanese
trademark applications were being contested. To support this result under the Vanity Fair
factors, the court took evidence on Japanese trademark law and concluded that the grant
of rights was unlikely. As discussed above, this may need to be the judicial modus
operandi of the future, but it departs significantly from the reflexive deference to possible
U.S. law to the defendant’s foreign conduct]”). To be sure, one might argue that the interest of a foreign
mark holder, with exclusive rights, is greater than the interest of a foreign user with non-exclusive rights
that exist by virtue of the absence of foreign trademark rights. But, if interests are defined in public rather
than private terms, determining those marks that are not granted trademark protection may regulate a
country or region’s economic climate as much as the grant of trademark rights. Moreover, the range of
competing administrative and judicial institutions (both national and regional) that might effect that
regulation is increasingly large. The Bulova factors, as traditionally applied, are too wooden a device to
accommodate a proper analysis of these complex issues.
201
See Sterling Drug Inc., 14 F.3d at 747 (“Where . . .both parties have legitimate interests, consideration
of those interests must receive especially sensitive accommodation in the international context”); cf. Simon
v. Philip Morris Inc., 2000 WL 1790420 at * 20 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2000) (noting that traditional
approaches to choice of law may require modification for the complex questions with which national courts
are now presented). As suggested above, see supra note 184, the Bulova factors as understood in Vanity
Fair are also insufficiently flexible to reflect the different institutions and laws that might now have an
interest in the availability of trademark rights in the international marketplace.
202
See supra text accompanying notes 128-36 (foreign laws); infra text accompanying note 223 (less than
exclusive rights).
203
945 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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conflicts with foreign law that one finds in cases such as Vanity Fair. Moreover, the
court found a substantial effect on U.S. commerce in part because of the now-actionable
dilution of the distinctiveness of the plaintiff’s mark (and the damage to the prospective
licensing opportunities for the American plaintiff in Japan). Thus conceived, most
American plaintiffs engaging in international commerce can find ample effects on U.S.
commerce, suggesting that some courts in the Second Circuit may be moving closer to
other courts on the assessment of U.S. effects sufficient to justify application of the
Lanham Act.
G. The effect of Public International Trademark Law on Choice of Law Problems
To the extent that there is broad-based harmonization of national laws, an ongoing
project of much public international law, there should be fewer choice of law problems.
Theoretically, the decision whether to apply French or U.S. law is of little import if those
two laws apply the same rules; this is a false conflict. But here the “competing trademark
ownership” choice of law problem is significant. In that context, as in others involving
the application of legal rules to different national factual settings, the application of the
same formal rule (for example, of priority) may still produce different results and thus
generate a conflicts problem.
Similarly, however, the conclusions that we reach on the feasibility of resolving
trademark choice of law disputes may guide the priorities set for public international
trademark policymaking. If choice of law problems appear intractable, certain public
international avenues for reform might appear necessary (or easier) alternatives.204 In
particular, the inability of private international law to resolve the conflict of existing
competing trademark rights might require a re-examination of the scope and nature of
substantive trademark rights.205
In particular, one might seek to ameliorate the choice of law difficulties presented
by online use by concluding public international agreements on certain substantive
trademark standards. Under such agreements, the scope of trademark rights under
national laws could be confined to exclude from their scope certain foreign online uses of
the mark notwithstanding that such uses have (by virtue merely of the global nature of the
internet) an effect in the domestic national market. That is to say, the solution to the
problem of inevitable global effects may be to revise substantive national trademark laws
such that certain of those global effects are deemed to be of no legal (trademark)
significance other than in a particular country. By restricting the scope of the substantive
national trademark rights, the clash of competing rights is thus reduced.
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See Bettinger and Thum, supra note 26, at 287 (arguing that, at least in the online context, “[s]ince it is
not the conflict of legal systems but rather the conflict of subjective property rights that must be solved,
classic conflict of law rules do not seem suitable for solving the conflict”).
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Conceptually, this approach mirrors traditional choice of law rules in that it seeks
to localize a multinational set of facts within a single national setting. This process of
localization is indeed the primary function of traditional conflictual applicable law rules.
But this approach would achieve the localization by retracting the scope of national
trademark rights rather than adopting a choice of law rule that would limit the reach of
national trademark laws. It would localize through trademark principles and not choice
of law principles.206
Thus, in seeking to resolve the choice of law problems of international trademark
law, I consider below how public international trademark lawmaking might ease some
difficulties, especially in the context of online use and competing ownership. I also
consider the role of anational arbitration of substantive trademark law issues in
addressing these problems.
H.

Mechanisms for Unifying Ownership

The competing ownership dilemma, especially as presented by online use, might
be addressed in several different ways. Absent prompt development of private
international law solutions, public lawmaking must orient itself more directly to the
question of unifying, or reconciling competing national, ownership. Several recent
international developments have contributed to this project, each in small but collectively
important ways. All international mechanisms that facilitate the broadest possible
multinational ownership of trademarks in a single person in the quickest possible way
ameliorate the problem (at least prospectively). To be sure, there may be other costs
involved in this strategy. In particular, it would precipitate the global depletion of marks
by allocation of rights to a single person who may use them only fleetingly in certain
markets. But taking the strategy as a legitimate one for current purposes, what devices
further this goal?
On the registration side, the Madrid Protocol and the Madrid Agreement become
essential.207 Similarly, in a smaller way, the approximation of national registration and
maintenance procedures effected by the Trademark Law Treaty should assist the
acquisition of multilateral rights.208 (The Paris Convention priority period obviously also
contributes to this process).209 Certain other provisions of international trademark law,
not directly aimed at simplifying registration mechanisms, also help. For example, the
provisions in treaties and recent WIPO Assembly Resolutions regarding the protection of
well-known marks even in countries where such marks mark have not been used or
registered enables the convergence of rights in a single person.210
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See Bettinger and Thum, supra note 26, at 287 (“[T]rademark conflict-of-law rules are not the
appropriate starting point for the solution to the problem. To solve the ‘conflict of rights’ on the Internet,
new rules of substantive law have to be developed for those genuinely international cases where national
substantive rights conflict in a global medium”).
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See supra note 16.
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See supra note 4.
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See Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 4.
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As discussed above, another means of achieving unification of ownership, would
be to enable acquisition of rights everywhere by use on the internet.211 In some ways,
this would extend the benefits of the Paris Convention on well known marks to all marks.
It would in effect replace the principle of territoriality with the principle of universality
(or would deem the geographic scope of internet use to be global). As noted above, such
a reform would, however, require a wholesale reversal of trends in twentieth century
international and national law and would command little support.
These strategies, especially the last, highlight the fact that any realistic solution
will still require individual national courts to make determinations of sufficient use,
distinctiveness, and competing considerations that are remarkably fact-specific.
Trademarks are inevitably liked to cultural understandings, particularly of language.
They reflect assumptions of consumer behavior, understanding, and confusion. These
understanding and assumptions remain, despite the internet and globalization, remarkably
geographically and nationally influenced.212
I.

The role of substantive trademark law reforms

In this Section, I discuss two proposals that seek to use reform of substantive
trademark law as a means of resolving some of the conflicts dilemmas presented by
international and online trademark use. Each proposal that I discuss would involve the
adoption as a matter of public international law (whether in treaty form or as a resolution
of the WIPO Assembly) of a common substantive rule to be applied by national courts in
disputes involving online trademark usage. Courts could, of course, of their own
initiative develop similar substantive rules to be applied to international or online use.
Indeed, I have argued that courts should consider developing special substantive rules as
a means of resolving the conflicts dilemmas presented by international copyright
litigation.213 In either instance, however, there will have to be ongoing efforts to interpret
such rules, whether instituted judicially or legislatively. Given the source of the problem,
courts should interpret such substantive rules in ways that promote international solutions
and accommodate competing national interests. This internationalist interpretation might
be easier for courts to effect with explicit instruction from national legislatures, and with
concomitant undertakings by other nations.214
1. Non-Exclusive Trademark Rights
Two German scholars, Torsten Bettinger and Dorothee Thum, have suggested
resolving online choice of law problems by moderating the exclusive nature of trademark
rights. That is, if our difficulties stem from the clash between the exclusive nature of
trademark rights and the number of legitimate users, one solution is to eliminate
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exclusivity such that all claimants may use the mark online.215 This goal is perhaps best
achieved at the remedial stage, but this approach could be considered more broadly as a
balancing or compromising of different national interests.216 In some ways, courts
ordering relief that seeks to achieve technological territorialization are applying a version
of this proposal. But the relief that enables co-existence of users could also consist, for
example, of mandatory injunctive relief requiring confusion-dispensing packaging of the
web site.217
Bettinger and Thum, characterize their proposal as a philosophy of “co-existence”
rather than exclusivity.218 They would, however, permit such online co-existence of
competing marks only if the foreign user is not making “unfair use” of the mark.219 They
offer several sets of circumstances where the interests of the domestic markholder are
likely to predominate, where the foreign use would be regarded as unfair, and where
consequently an injunction should be granted notwithstanding the general rule of coexistence online. For example, abusive registration for purpose of cybersquatting or
preventing expansion would not be fair use. And use of a country code suffix of the
domestic country would suggest an intent to intrude unfairly upon the domestic market.
Intentional confusion would be unfair, as would “systematic imitation” of the mark.
Bettinger and Thum would also give extra protection, and tend to grant prohibitory
injunctive relief, where the mark is well-known or famous within the meaning of Article
6bis of the Paris Convention and Article 16 of the TRIPS Agreement. Such marks are
granted a broader scope of protection by international agreements,220 and thus should be
more resistant to contractions of scope. Also, such marks are already likely to be given
(by virtue of those treaties) protection in many different countries notwithstanding the
215
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premise of territoriality and thus efficiency suggests that the mark owner with this
collection of rights should be given preference.
In determining whether a situation warrants co-existence, Bettinger and Thum
suggest that a court should consider not only the extent to which the domestic mark
owner’s interests are impacted, but also the consequences of a ruling that the foreign user
refrain from internet use of the mark (e.g., having to abandon the mark or refrain from
internet advertising). In particular, they suggest that “the interests of the domestic
rightholder are less strongly affected by the perceptibility of the foreign trademark on the
internet than by the sale of the product in [the domestic market].”221 At first glance, this
assessment restricts the trademark owner’s interests (perhaps rightly, but against the trend
of contemporary trademark law) to protection against diversion of sales, which is
essentially a restriction to protection against point of sale source-confusion.222
It may be that trademark owners should be willing to accept this restriction
because without it their own ability to use the mark online might be imperiled by
reciprocal aggressive assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the courts of foreign
mark holders. More limited rights might therefore be mutually beneficial to trademark
holders (at least in the case of two legitimate competing trademark owners). And it may
also be that because Bettinger and Thum would grant broader protection to well-known
marks via their “unfair use” analysis their proposal may preserve dilution protection.223
But, more importantly, it is clear that resolution of the conflicts issues presented by
international and online trademark use may require a re-assessment of the scope of
trademark rights.
The determination whether to recognize the exclusivity of the domestic mark
owner’s rights and grant an injunction against foreign use that intrudes on local goodwill
will require a balancing of the interests of the local mark owner and the foreign user. If
courts are instructed to balance the competing interests of the domestic and foreign mark
users – to decide whether to seek a compromise remedy or to favor one user over the
other – the courts are clearly likely to assume a greater role in mediating rival
prescriptive claims. Such balancing inevitably will be fact-intensive.224 But this is not to
say that legislatures or international organizations have no role in facilitating this
221
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approach, if it is deemed the preferable one. Absent such guidance, courts may be
reluctant to mediate claims in ways that involve the application of a law other than their
own.225 National courts have an understandable tendency to prefer the national domestic
right holder and vindicate the rights of that person over the foreign user.226
2. Restrained Definitions of Use
The problems that the internet has caused private international trademark law
have recently been addressed by the WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of
Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geographical Indications.227 In particular, over the
past two years the Committee has sought to harmonize national approaches to the
question of “use” of marks on the internet, and has therefore developed a draft set of
provisions on the concept of “use.”228 In use-based systems, such as the United States,
the concept is obviously central to the acquisition of rights. But even in registrationbased systems, the maintenance and enforcement of rights may require use of the mark
by the producer, and infringement depends upon use of the mark by the defendant. Use is
central to trademark law, whether in a use-based or registration-based system.229
Although the SCT project consciously avoids the question of applicable law,230
international adoption of its proposals would substantially mitigate some of the choice of
law problems discussed above. The proposal consists of two primary components. The
first component of the proposal reduces the number of likely conflicts and thus problems
of choice of law in the online environment; the second component provides a flexible rule
of substantive trademark law that mediates the conflicts that occur notwithstanding the
first part of the proposal.
Under the first component, use of the sign on the internet would only be treated as
use in any particular state for the various purposes identified above if the use of the sign
225

See supra text accompanying notes 95-102.
See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Bettinger
and Thum, supra note 26, at 295 (discussing reaction of German courts in domain name disputes); cf.
Dinwoodie, supra note 153, at 569 n.342 (discussing means of implementing less forum-centered approach
to international copyright cases); Ginsburg, supra note 51, at 39 (noting the tendency of U.S. courts to
apply the lex fori in international copyright cases).
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See Standing Committee on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geographical Indications,
Protection of Industrial Property Rights in Relation to the Use of Signs on the Internet, WIPO Doc. No.
SCT/5/2 (June 21, 2000) [hereinafter SCT Memorandum]; Summary by the Chair, Standing Committee on
the Law of Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geographical Indications, WIPO Doc. No. SCT/5/5 (Sept.
15, 2000) [hereinafter Sept. 2000 SCT Summary].
228
Eighty countries agreed in principle to the draft provisions in September 2000, and the final text of the
proposal will be discussed at the March 2001 SCT meeting, with a view to adoption by WIPO member
states in September 2001. See Report of the Standing Committee on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial
Designs and Geographical Indications, WIPO Doc. No. SCT/4/6 (Sept. 19, 2000) at 3 [hereinafter SCT
Report].
229
See SCT Memorandum, supra note 227, at 4.
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See id. at 4 (leaving the question of applicable law to individual states). The proposal also eschews any
effort to harmonize the effect of use in a member state, which will remain a matter of unharmonized
national law. See id. at 8 (noting that the legal effects of use would remain to be determined by member
states in accordance with the law determined to be applicable).
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has a “commercial effect” in that state.231 The proposal further details the factors
relevant to a determination whether a sign has a commercial effect in a state. The factors
are non-exhaustive and include whether the user is doing or planning to do business in a
particular state (although use of the sign can have a commercial effect in a country
without the user doing business there). The language and currency used on the web site
where the mark is used, as well as any explicit disclaimer of the ability to delivery goods
in a particular state, would be relevant. Actual restraints on the ability of the producer to
deliver goods (for example, regulatory hurdles) would also provide guidance, as would
whether the web site had actually been visited by persons from a particular state. The
interactivity of the web site might also be an important factor.232
Although the WIPO SCT proposal is framed as harmonization of substantive
trademark law, the variables that would be relevant to any analysis of “commercial
effect” closely approximate the proposals being advanced by many writers (and being
developed by the U.S. courts) as evidence of “targeting” or “purposeful availment”
sufficient to found adjudicative jurisdiction in the online context.233 The factors are also
similar to those mentioned by Bettinger and Thum as relevant to the “fairness” of foreign
use, upon which their proposal of co-existence is premised.234 In short, through different
doctrinal vehicles, there is support for the proposition that internet use of a mark of
another might be regarded as use sufficient to infringe trademark rights only in countries
with which the use has a connection other than merely being accessible via online
activity.235
Such connections,236 which would reveal an intent237 to interfere with specific
national rights, might include the language of the website,238 the nationality and location
231

See Draft SCT Provisions, Sept. 2000 SCT Summary, supra note 227, Annex [hereinafter Draft SCT
Provisions] § 2 (“Use of a sign on the Internet shall constitute use of the sign in a Member States for the
purposes of determining [whether such use establishes, maintains, or infringes industrial property rights or
constitutes an act of unfair competition] only if the use has a commercial effect in that Member State as
described in Section 3,”). The SCT Proposal would not require states to adopt a use-based system. See
SCT Memorandum, supra note 227, at 16.
232
The full listing of factors is found in Section 3 of the SCT proposal. See id. § 3.
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See supra text accompanying note 93-94.
234
See supra text accompanying notes 219-22.
235
See Draft SCT Provisions, supra note 231, § 7; Bettinger and Thum, supra note 26, at 291-92 (listing
authors supporting this approach and exploring its application).
236
Some of these particular factors (e.g., language, culturally-directed products) may represent a bygone
culture. Variables that might at one time point to sales in a single country may now be less relevant: for
example, do British consumers really care that the book is written in American English? Standardization of
online language, cultural assimilation, technical standardization, and the nature of online shopping (where
the consumer is an active determinant of what appears on the screen), all undermine the ability of these
factors to exclude a large number of internet uses from the morass of competing trademark rights. Only
rarely (most likely with local services) will these variables affirmatively suggest that internet use is
nationally confined. Moreover, the meaning of these factors to consumers and producers may be
susceptible to change as society changes. Targeting cannot become embedded as the only activity that
implicates national interests. The nature of online commerce may evolve such that passive producers and
actively-searching consumers become the norm. It is important, therefore, that we attempt no exhaustive
articulation of relevant considerations and which way they cut.
237
Generally speaking, intent has not been an element of modern trademark causes of action. But intent, in
the form of purposeful availment of the benefits of a jurisdiction, is a consideration that courts in the United
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of persons accessing the web site,239 the nature of the products being sold,240 activity
offline,241 the use of a web site with a domain name address including a particular
country code top level domain (such as .uk),242 or other variables revealing conscious
targeting of the national market in question.243 Under the SCT Proposal, the existence of
industrial property rights would also be relevant, both in favoring the activity of persons
owning rights abroad and in diminishing the claims of persons such as cybersquatters
who have no such rights and whose conduct was motivated by the rights inhering in
others.244

States have taken into account in determining whether a foreign defendant should be subject to the
jurisdiction of the U.S. courts. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S.
102 (1987). Personal jurisdiction case law might therefore be of some interest in this context.
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See Draft SCT Provisions, supra note 231, § 3(1)(d)(iv); Bettinger & Thum, supra note 26, at 292
(identifying the language of a web site as relevant “other domestic connecting factor”); cf. GB Mktg. USA
Inc. v. Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH & Co., 782 F. Supp. 763 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (exercising subject matter
jurisdiction over foreign activity that contributed to copyright infringement in the United States where the
language used on product labels clearly revealed the defendant’s intent to target the U.S. market).
Depending upon the evolution of internet activity, language may tend to exclude rather than include
national interests, as a large percentage of web sites are in English. See UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999, at 6 (Oxford Univ. Press. 1999) (reporting that 80% of web sites are written
in English, although less than 10% of the world’s population speaks English); see also SCT Memorandum,
supra note 227, at 14 (“language can be a decisive factor if the language used on the web site is not widely
spoken outside the Member State in question. However, the more widely a language is used outside the
Member State, the less conclusive is the evidence provided by its use”). But the adoption of English as the
contemporary lingua franca may change this. See supra note 236.
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See Draft SCT Provisions, supra note 231, § 3(1)(d)(v); cf. National Football League v. TVRadioNow
Corp., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1831, 1834-35 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (noting, in finding U.S. publication in a copyright
infringement litigation, that 45% of the hits on a Canadian website were from the United States). One
would, of course, have to exclude hits generated by the plaintiff. See Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F.
Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
240
See Draft SCT Provisions, supra note 231, § 3(1)(c)(i). For example, electrical goods operating under
only one currency used in particular countries might suggest a more limited intended market. See also Jian
Tools for Sales Inc v. Roderick Manhattan Grp. Ltd., [1995] FSR 924 (Ch. D. 1995) (Eng.) (software for
business planning permitted use only of U.S. dollars and structured around U.S. legal and economic
model). Local services would appear unlikely to target remote jurisdictions; if the goods were capable of
online digital delivery, global intent is more easily drawn; goods that are said to be delivered only in a
particular country would appear targeted only to that country. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F.
Supp. 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997) is an example of these factors applying in the
jurisdictional context. The fact that the defendant in that case was using the plaintiff’s mark online in a
geographically remote location for services that were inherently local (advertising a jazz club that could
only be attended by persons in the defendant’s local area) justified the court’s conclusion that the defendant
was not present in the plaintiff’s area of business even though the defendant’s web site could be accessed
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See Draft SCT Provisions, supra note 231, § 3(1)(b)(i). Bettinger and Thum suggest that particular
weight might be given to offline references to the web site. See Bettinger and Thum, supra note 26, at 292.
242
See Draft SCT Provisions, supra note 231, § 3(1)(d)(iii). Bettinger and Thum suggest that use of a
country code in the domain name of the web site in question should give rise to a presumption of an intent
to target the particular country whose country code is used. See Bettinger and Thum, supra note 26, at 292.
This may have the effect of driving producers to market goods on sites with addresses in the generic top
level domains in order to confine the jurisdictions in which they would be amenable to suit.
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See Draft SCT Provisions, supra note 231, § 3(2).
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See id., § 3(1)(e).
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The SCT approach bears some resemblance to approaches that have in the past
been advocated by U.S. conflicts scholars to avoid (rather than to resolve) true
conflicts.245 For example, in response to criticism of his initial approach to what he
called true conflicts – which was simply to apply the law of the forum – Brainerd Currie
suggested that courts instead re-examine the competing laws and interpret the scope of
their own substantive law “with restraint and moderation.”246 He argued that, upon such
analysis, courts might find that any conflict might be apparent only and not real. Currie
detected examples of such an approach in several decisions of the California courts.247
Essentially, the SCT is suggesting that each forum should assess the potential application
of its own law with “restraint and moderation” to avoid a conflict in the first place.
The second component of the SCT proposal limits the liability of the owner of
trademark rights in one country who uses its mark online in a way that has a commercial
effect in another state. In particular, such a mark owner will not be liable to the mark
owner in that other state prior to receiving a “notification of infringement” provided that
its rights were not acquired in bad faith and that contact details are provided on the web
site where the sign is displayed.248 Even upon receiving a notification, the user could
avoid liability by expeditiously taking steps to “avoid commercial effect in the country
where notice was served without unreasonably burdening the user’s commercial activity”
and to avoid confusion249 with the mark owner in that country.250 If those steps include
the use of a disclaimer in accordance with the terms of Section 9 of the Draft provisions,
the user is conclusively presumed to have satisfied the standard.251 Such disclaimers
should, inter alia, make clear that the user of the sign does not intend to deliver goods to
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Substantive law making of this sort may be assigned to a variety of institutional bodies. I have argued
elsewhere that courts should consider developing special substantive rules as a means of resolving the
conflicts dilemmas presented by international copyright litigation. See Dinwoodie, supra note 153. The
WIPO proposals would seek to achieve public international agreement on such substantive principles and
have the consensus rule enacted in discrete national laws. This approach thus resists the widespread
ongoing judicial development of further compromise rules (as I sought to achieve in my copyright
proposal), by instead seeking (via its first component) to withdraw certain states from particular factual
disputes rather than incorporating all their interests in the “mix” in litigation.
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See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 759-64 (1963).
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See, e.g., People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 48 Cal.2d 595 (1957).
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See Draft SCT Provisions, supra note 231, § 8(1).
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As seen with the Bettinger and Thum proposal, see supra text accompanying notes 220-22, avoiding
choice of law problems through substantive harmonization obviously has consequences for trademark law
of which sight cannot be lost. For example, by premising this safe harbor only on avoidance of confusion,
the provision would at first glance appear effectively to exclude certain non-confusion based dilution
protection for marks online, thus creating one of the few “substantive maxima” in international intellectual
property law. See Draft Provisions, supra note 231, § 10(2)(ii). Section 10 moderates this by providing
that analysis of bad faith (which would ensure the non-application of the exception) shall include
consideration of whether the use of the sign would dilute the right holder’s mark.
250
See id. § 8(2). In order to give meaning to the second part of the safe harbor provision, avoidance of
commercial effect cannot be intended to be an absolute prerequisite (otherwise there would be no liability,
because the first part of the proposals would preclude a finding of use by the defendant). Thus, a defendant
may be immune from liability notwithstanding commercial effect in a country.
251
See id. § 9.
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the particular member state where a conflicting right exists and that he has no relationship
with the owner of the conflicting right.252
This “notice and avoid conflict” procedure in the current draft replaced a
provision in the previous draft of the provisions, which had contained a general exception
from liability for right holders who in good faith used their signs on the internet.253 By
effectively retaining the exception prior to any notification, the SCT Proposal would
enable mark owners to proceed with internet use of their marks without conducting a
worldwide search for conflicting rights.
The SCT proposals would also instruct national courts granting a remedy against
internet use to consider the effect that any injunction would have in other states.254 Any
remedy must be proportionate to the commercial effect of the use in the member state in
question. And “if possible, under the applicable law, . . .[the court] shall take into
account . . . the number of Member States in which the conflicting rights is [sic] also
protected, the number of Member States in which the infringing sign is protected by an
industrial property right, and the relative extent of use on the internet.”255 In particular,
the remedies should not force a user who has rights in a mark in one country to wholly
abandon use of the mark on the internet if it has acted in good faith. Such global
injunctions are expressly prohibited by Section 14.256 The draft provisions contain
examples of alternative remedial options (such as gateway web pages), which have
grown out of practice and experience over the past few years.257
Global injunctions may, however, be appropriate in certain circumstances.
Indeed, the historical anachronism that is causing current problems with international
trademark law is undue adherence to territoriality, not globalization. Where bad faith
occurs by blatant infringers, without any rights or privileges of use, global injunctions are
to be applauded.
J. Autonomous Bodies of Private International law
As discussed above,258 domain names are inherently non-national, and their
interaction with national trademark rights has thus presented courts and policymakers
with extremely challenging issues of private international law. Indeed, the particular
problems posed by the use of domain names that incorporate trademarks in whole or in
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Although Section 9 is intended to provide certainty to right holders and is expressly linked to the
exemption of Section 8, the Notes accompanying the earlier drafts suggest that the provisions do not
address whether the safe harbor should be available even where the user does not own rights in the sign.
See SCT Memorandum, supra note 227, at 30. Cf. supra note 200 (discussing the differential treatment of
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See SCT Memorandum, supra note 227, at 26.
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See Draft SCT Provisions, supra note 231, §§ 11-13.
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part have prompted the development of another approach to the conciliation of national
trademark rights in an international era.
Domain names in the generic top level domains are allocated by registrars accredited
by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). Each registrar
accredited by ICANN to offer such names must agree to require domain name applicants
to resolve (before an ICANN-approved dispute settlement provider) any dispute
regarding the domain name that arises between the applicant and a trademark owner.259
This agreement is thus a mandatory part of any application to register a domain name in
the generic top level domain. This façade of consent is sufficient to ensure that panels
have jurisdiction to hear such disputes.
Disputes that are brought before ICANN panels are decided according to the Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the UDRP).260 The UDRP, and additional
rules elaborating upon the conduct of proceedings, were promulgated by ICANN in
October 1999, and the first cases were heard by ICANN panels in December 1999. Then
proceedings have been extremely popular with trademark owners. In the first year of the
Policy’s operation, over 2500 cases were filed involving over 3200 domain names.261
Decisions are handed down within 45 days of the filing of the complaint. The process is
inexpensive. And trademark owners are prevailing in approximately 75% of cases, which
may be the strongest factor coloring the perception of the procedure.
The UDRP provides trademark owners with relief only in limited circumstances,
however. In particular, a complainant must show:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)

that the domain name in question is identical or confusingly similar to a
trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights;
that the domain name registrant has no rights or legitimate interests in respect
of the domain name; and
the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.262

These elements, collectively, demonstrate cybersquatting, which is the focus of an action
under the UDRP. If a complaint is made out, and the decision is not challenged within
ten days by the losing registrant before a national court, the panelist will order the
cancelation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the trademark
owner.263
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See ICANN Registrar Agreement, § J, available at http://www.icann.org/registrars/ra-agreement12may99.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2001).
260
See Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, available at
http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm (visited Jan. 10, 2001).
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See http://www.icann.org/udrp/proceedings-stat.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2001).
262
See UDRP, supra note 260, Rule 4(a).
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See id., Rule 3(c) (transfer or cancellation of name); Rule 4(k) (providing ten day stay of transfer).
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An explication of the developing panel jurisprudence interpreting these terms, and
the principal points of contention, is a topic in and of itself.264 But some aspects of the
UDRP warrant consideration as part of an assessment of the private international law of
trademarks because the UDRP embodies another approach to the problems tackled in this
paper, namely, the development by specially convened non-national dispute resolution
panels of an autonomous body of substantive law governing particular international (in
this case, domain name) disputes.
Unlike court decisions, international arbitration decisions are the subject of an
existing broad-based multinational recognition and enforcement scheme. The New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards requires
signatory states to recognize and enforce arbitration awards issued by arbitrators subject
to limited enumerated defenses (which do not include legal errors on the part of the
arbitrator).265 Co-opting that multilateral system as a means of providing greater
certainty to trademark owners and domain name registrants seeking to resolve disputes
potentially subject to a variety of competing national laws and institutions is thus
attractive. For all these reasons, arbitration would appear to offer some advantages over a
potential multiplicity of national court litigation. Indeed, some policymakers and
scholars have suggested that the UDRP model might be extended to certain other
internet-based disputes, or to internet-based disputes generally.266
These benefits may, however, be less easily secured than it might first appear.
First, the question of applicable law remains a contentious issue, in ways that are not
unfamiliar. Although Rule 4 of the UDRP sets out the essential elements of the cause of
action that trademark owners can pursue (and, hence, the jurisdiction of the panels),
adjudication of disputes requires interpretation of the terms of that policy. Rule 15(a) of
the Rules accompanying the UDRP provides that “ a panel shall decide a complaint on
the basis of the statements and documents submitted and in accordance with the Policy,
264

Analysis of ICANN, the organization that adopted the rules, is also worthy of sustained study. See
generally Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and The Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187 (2000); A.
Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the
Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17 (2000). For a discussion of the broader systemic and institutional questions
raised by the establishment of the UDRP by ICANN, see Graeme B. Dinwoodie and Laurence R. Helfer,
Hybrid Anational Adjudication: Intellectual Property Law at the Domain Name Frontier (copy on file with
author).
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See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (“New York Convention”). Permitted defenses to recognition include
invalid arbitration agreements, lack of due process, excess of authority, irregular composition of the
tribunal, or a violation of the public policy of the enforcing state. See id. art. V.
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See Subcommittee Tackles Jurisdiction Issues on Internet, 60 PAT. TRAD. COPR. J. (BNA) 214, 215
(July 14, 2000) (reporting testimony before House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts and
Intellectual Property which “debated the usefulness of the [UDRP] . . . as a possible model for resolving
complex jurisdictional issues”); ABA JURISDICTION PROJECT, supra note 36, at ¶ 1.4.7 (describing UDRP
as a “promising example” for creating “new forms of dispute resolution” by private parties and
governmental bodies for Internet disputes that cross national borders); Directive 2000/31/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society
services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, arts. 12-14, and recitals 40-46, O.J. L
178, 1, 6, 12-13 (providing that member states should encourage the development of notice and takedown
procedures by means of "voluntary agreement between all parties concerned").
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these Rules and rules and principles of law that it deems applicable.”267 Some panels
have had resort to principles developed under national laws to interpret the terms of the
Policy,268 while others have sought to find meaning in the language and history of the
UDRP (often as interpreted by other panels).269 This introduces both horizontal and
vertical choice of law questions into the analysis. Horizontally, if panels are to have
regard to national law, to which national law should they look? The traditional problems
of choice of law referenced above resurface. Vertically, if the international rules laid
down in the Policy are to apply with an occasional interjection of national rules or
principles, what are the principles according to which the balance of international and
national rules is to be calibrated?270 Again, this question parallels that which confronts
courts in federal systems on a daily basis and is implicated in the contest between EU and
national law that the European Court of Justice must confront on a regular basis.
Moreover, adjudication of disputes may require reference to rights that exist under
national law. In order to have standing to bring a complaint, a trademark owner must
demonstrate “that the domain name in question is identical or confusingly similar to a
trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights.”271 This will not always
be a mechanical process, and may involve determinations by panelists of the validity of
rights under national laws.272 Given the traditional reluctance to permit judicial review of
foreign administrative acts of registration, affirmed by the current draft of the proposed
Hague Convention, should panelists be willing to accept national registrations
unquestioningly as evidence of trademark rights upon which a complaint under the
267

See Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, available at
http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-24oct99.htm (last visited January 10, 2001).
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See, e.g., World Wrestling Federation Entertainment, Inc. v. Michael Bosman, WIPO Case No. D990001 (Jan. 14, 2000) (citing U.S. case law to interpret the meaning of “use”); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
wallmartsuckscanada.com, WIPO Case No. D2000-1104 at 9 (Nov. 23, 2000) (noting in case involving the
challenge by a U.S. company, holding trademarks in Canada and the United States, to the registration of a
domain name by a Canadian citizen with a Canadian –based registrar, that “U.S. ACPA and trademark
infringement cases are natural sources of rules and principles of law to apply in resolving this dispute”
because of their similarity to the UDRP standards).
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See, e.g., Array Printers AB v. Lennart Nordell, WIPO Case No. D2000-0092 (Apr. 10, 2000) (applying
the principles developed by other panels); 3636275 Canada, dba eResolution v. eResolution.com, WIPO
Case No. D2000-0110 (April 10, 2000) (“Although entitled to consider principles of law deemed
applicable, the Panel finds it unnecessary to do so in any depth. The jurisprudence which is being rapidly
developed by a wide variety of Panelists worldwide under the ICANN Policy provides a fruitful source of
precedent.”).
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I refer to these rules as “international” in nature but they differ in many respects from what we would
traditionally regard as international law. More appropriate terms might be “anational”, see Dinwoodie and
Helfer, supra note 264, at 2 n.7, or “non-national”. See Dinwoodie, supra note 11, at 513 n.59. Such a
debate is, however, beyond the scope of the current paper.
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UDRP, supra note 260, Rule 4(a) (emphasis added).
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This would be essential if the complainant is relying upon the existence of unregistered rights. Cf. 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a). Whether a complainant will rely on unregistered rights will depend in large part upon
the willingness of panels to accept national registrations as automatically sufficient to confer standing upon
the complainant, without analysis of the substantive validity of those registrations. See infra text
accompanying note 273-74. If panels do defer to national registrations, regardless of the nation that grants
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III, panelist, dissenting in part) (discussing “foreign trademark shopping”).
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UDRP may rest?273 At least one ICANN panelist, dissenting from a decision to transfer a
domain name from its registrant to the complaining mark owner, has raised some concern
about reliance upon (foreign) national registrations as the basis for a complaint where the
complainant has been unable to secure equivalent rights in its own country.274
How to approach each of these aspects of adjudicating disputes under the UDRP
remains unclear. For present purposes, however, it is worth noting simply that these
issues undermine one apparent benefit of the Policy, namely its ability to resolve the
competition of national laws by instituting a set of autonomous international standards.275
This may not be a bad thing. The “wiggle room” that these ambiguities create may be a
means of providing greater certainty in the international arena without wholly sacrificing
the benefits of national experimentation and allowing room for expressions of appropriate
national autonomy.276 And the UDRP, despite these unresolved issues, may provide the
vehicle for concrete exploration of how to mediate national and international interests, as
well as competing national interests.
Second, it is not clear that the benefits of automatic recognition are available to
ICANN panel decisions. In particular, the decisions of the ICANN panels may not
constitute final decisions subject to recognition and enforcement under the New York
Convention. Rule 4(k) of the UDRP explicitly contemplates that panel decisions might
be subject to de novo review by national courts, which is quite inconsistent with the
concept of final arbitral awards to which the New York Convention commands
deference. Indeed, the status of the panel decisions for the purposes of the New York
Convention prompts consideration of two other issues that will affect the value of the
UDRP system. What is the relationship between panel decisions and national court
decisions? And, what is the precedential effect of panel decisions in the context of later
panel arbitrations?
As to the first matter, the relationship with national decisions has not yet been
tested. But national courts and legislatures are not treating the UDRP and decisions
rendered thereunder as determinative of conflicts between trademark owners and domain
name registrants even in the limited context of cybersquatting. Many national courts
have provided trademark owners independent relief against cybersquatting under national
273

See Ty Inc. v. Joseph Parvin d/b/a Domains For Sale, WIPO Case No. D2000-0688 at 4 (Nov. 9, 2000)
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laws.277 And the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act,278 enacted in the United
States in late 1999, permits domain name registrants whose domain name has been
canceled or transferred pursuant to the UDRP (or a similar policy) to file a civil action in
U.S. federal court against the prevailing party to establish that the registration and use of
the domain name was lawful (under the Lanham Act).279 If the domain name registrant is
successful, the court may “grant injunctive relief to the domain name registrant, including
the reactivation of the domain name or transfer of the domain name to the domain name
registrant.”280 Courts in the United States have indicated, moreover, that UDRP panel
decisions will not in any way be binding upon them.281
The UDRP itself makes provision for parallel national proceedings, before, during
and after panel arbitration.282 Indeed, the losing domain name registrant may suspend the
transfer of the domain name registration to the prevailing mark owner by filing an action
in national court within ten days of the panel decision.283 Thus, it is clear that domain
name registrars would comply with the orders of national courts.284 But this returns us
once more to the dilemma of which national courts and which national laws should
govern trademark disputes (here cybersquatting) in the context of online use.
The question of the precedential effect of UDRP decisions is a matter of concern
that is already on the agenda of international policymakers.285 If the UDRP is to realize
one of its potential benefits, namely the evolution of autonomous international principles
277
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that ameliorate the problems of competing national laws, the means of determining the
source of those principles, which Rule 15 currently sidesteps, must be developed in more
concrete terms.286 It may be that the appropriate “choice of law” rule cannot initially be
stated by ICANN in terms more specific than currently found in Rule 15. And the
development of common judicial approaches to the effect of panel decisions may be
difficult in a system that accommodates civil law methodologies but is dominated by U.S.
parties and U.S. panelists. But the methods by which panelists decide to apply
approaches endorsed by other non-national ICANN panels over competing national rules
must be transparent both to enable parties to understand fully their rights and to enable
national and international institutions to appreciate any need to reform the UDRP.
Third, some of the success attributed to the UDRP is a result of its consciously
limited scope. It addresses a range of conduct – cybersquatting – upon which there is
broad international consensus, and upon which divergent national views had not
previously formed. And panels may only grant relief of a type that does not require the
involvement of national judicial or executive authorities. The relief available – the
cancellation or transfer of the domain name registration – is within the power of the
registrars, and thus the system contains a built-in enforcement mechanism. Any
extension of the scope of panel jurisdiction, or of panels’ remedial powers, would arouse
both competing national views on substantive issues of trademark (and other) law, and
would require the commandeering of national authorities as the enforcement arm of
ICANN. Thus, while the success of the UDRP in providing relief against cybersquatting
suggests that there is a role for alternative (non-national) forms of dispute resolution in
addressing the private international quandaries of internet related trademark problems, it
is not clear that the model can easily be extended beyond the cybersquatting context.
This group of concerns about the UDRP as a model for addressing inherently nonnational disputes suggests that traditional private international law inquiries of
jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition of judgments will remain important in
protecting the rights of citizens and in mediating the claims and interests of different
interested institutions. This is particularly so if the UDRP is expanded, either by the
adoption of new ICANN policies or by panels making broad assertions of prescriptive
jurisdiction.
But this does not mean that the UDRP, or a system modeled on the UDRP, does
not have a role to play in the resolution of private international problems of trademark
law (especially online).287 The development of substantive rules governing international
disputes might come from a variety of sources: national courts,288 multinational treaties,
286
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and international arbitration panels such as those convened under the UDRP. The
involvement of a variety of institutions may enhance the legitimacy, and improve the
content, of those rules. Moreover, although I have raised numerous questions regarding
difficult issues still to be squarely confronted by ICANN-convened panels, the UDRP has
thus far provided fast and inexpensive relief to trademark owners in a large number of
uncontroversial cases. And it should (if panels are willing to tackle such issues) provide
an alternative and concrete means through which to address the more contentious issues
of mediating national and international interests. Such mechanisms clearly have a role to
play in navigating (or, at least reducing the number of) private international problems in
trademark law.
IV. Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
In the United States, the rules on recognition and enforcement of judgments are
shaped by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution and the Full
Faith and Credit Act.289 These rules do not apply to the recognition of the judgments of
foreign nations. But U.S. courts are generally respectful of the judgments of foreign
nations, both out of concern for judicial comity and because many states have adopted
(with some variations) model legislation on the recognition of foreign money
judgments.290 Under this legislation, the judgments of foreign nations should largely be
recognized absent lack of jurisdiction in the rendering court (typically determined by U.S.
standards) 291 and provided that enforcement would not violate U.S. public policy.292
Although an old U.S. Supreme Court case sanctioned the non-enforcement of a French
judgment against an American defendant on the grounds of lack of reciprocal recognition
by French courts of U.S. judgments,293 many states do not demand reciprocity as a
condition for enforcement.
Other than lack of jurisdiction in the rendering court, the principal circumstance
in which the enforcement of a foreign trademark judgment might be susceptible to nonenforcement in the United States might be where the foreign judgment implicates
questions of free speech. Several U.S. courts have refused to enforce British libel
judgments on the grounds that the procedural aspects of British libel proceedings offend
the public values of free speech embodied in the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.294 (Similar public policy exceptions to recognition do not exist in the
domestic U.S. context, where states and federal courts are required to give full faith and
credit to the judgments of other states.) The grant of property rights in symbols and
289
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language clearly does implicate free speech issues. But as the United States Supreme
Court has been largely unwilling to find broad rights under U.S. trademark law (or its
equivalent) inconsistent with the First Amendment,295 it is unlikely that non-recognition
is a serious danger in the United States.
Under the Brussels Convention, courts in the Member States of the EU must
automatically recognize and enforce judgments rendered by courts in other EU states
properly seized of jurisdiction, subject to certain defined exceptions.296 The most notable
exception is the public policy exception also found in U.S. law and discussed above. The
Brussels Convention is in the process of being formally adopted into EU law as a
Regulation on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments.297
The Proposed Hague Convention is similar (but not identical) to the Brussels
Convention. It too has an exclusion from recognition where enforcement would violate
public policy.298 The scope of any such provision is, of course, unclear; such is the
nature of discretionary judicial escape-hatches. Harmonization of trademark laws will
limit the likelihood of such occurrences. And, in any event, a mere difference in (conflict
of) laws should not be sufficient to justify a refusal to enforce or recognize a judgment;
otherwise the Hague system would provide minimal advantages over the application of
lex fori by serial national courts.299 Indeed, the incompatibility with public policy
sufficient to justify non-enforcement should arguably be greater than that sufficient to
justify a court’s refusal to apply a law chosen by application of its basic choice of law
rule because the foreign law violated public policy. After a foreign court has expended
judicial resources on adjudicating a case, the interests of the foreign state (and the parties)
in recognition are heightened by virtue of the investment of time and resources that has
occurred.
Textually, there are some differences between the Brussels Convention and the
Proposed Hague Convention. Like the Brussels Convention, the Hague Convention
would (subject to similar exceptions) provide for automatic recognition and enforcement
of judgments of rendering courts whose jurisdiction was founded on a ground expressly
permitted by the Convention.300 And judgments entered by courts founding jurisdiction
on a ground expressly prohibited, such as those in Article 18, would automatically not be
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recognized or enforced.301 But the draft Hague Convention creates a category of
jurisdictional bases that are neither entitled to the benefits of automatic recognition and
enforcement in other contracting states generally accorded under the Convention under
Article 25, nor automatically denied recognition (as happens with respect to prohibited
grounds of jurisdiction). The Hague Convention would provide that enforcing courts
have discretion whether to enforce judgments rendered by courts that based jurisdiction
on grounds other than those expressly permitted in the Convention but which are not
prohibited.302
The WIPO Standing Committee on Trademarks has recognized the potential
significance of this draft Convention to intellectual property law, as has the United States
government.303 The Hague project may indeed be crucial. Instituting a systemic
approach to jurisdiction and recognition of judgments, even if skeletal and requiring
elaboration by the courts, would put in place the institutional framework for developing
principles according to which national interests could be mediated and international
disputes resolved on an ongoing basis
If the Hague Convention were adopted, the interaction between private and public
international law would develop in several different and important ways. Courts would
be more willing to apply foreign laws and decide consolidate worldwide litigation if they
felt that their decisions would automatically be recognized and enforced rather than
thought of as an intrusion on a state’s governmental acts (as is currently the case). It
would affirm institutionally a commitment to move beyond the archaic premise of
territoriality that bedevils intellectual property law. Moreover, forcing (or enabling)
courts to consider different national laws, and the respective claims of each both in
prescriptive force and substantive merit, would facilitate the development of choice of
law rules in intellectual property law for the first time and the convergence of national
laws to generate substantive rules of intellectual property law appropriate for
international disputes.304 Thus consolidated private international litigation might be seen
more easily as an alternative vehicle to public international law for the development of
convergent international principles.305
Most importantly, the Hague Agreement embodies a prospective commitment to
the reconciliation of competing claims and values. Without it, the internationalization
and digitization of contemporary society will force reconciliation through other less
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palatable means: through competing legislative and judicial efforts to extrude laws and
values internationally in order only (and understandably) to protect their national interests
and values.306 The recent Yahoo litigation is a precursor of such efforts;307 calls for the
legislative sanction of further forays into extraterritoriality are harbingers of what it is
ahead.308
Moreover, such adherence will not entail commitment by numerous states to
particular substantive principles of intellectual property law, a task that is likely to be
difficult and arguably dangerous to appropriate national autonomy. Instead, joining the
Hague Convention (including a deletion of the exclusive jurisdiction provision, at least
for trademarks, where registration is often cursory) would be a commitment to a principle
of international co-existence. The detailed means by which that co-existence plays out
would be developed in the context of concrete intellectual property disputes. The
potential advantages of such an internationalist approach are many, although their accrual
depends in large part upon national judicial enthusiasm for such an internationalist
project.309
The Hague Convention incorporates these advantages within its approach. It
leaves determinations under the Convention to national courts, aware of the exceptions
for public policy that allow the continuing assertion of national values to reflect the
continuing role of the nation-state as the vehicle for the democratic expression of values.
But it does so subject to the common instruction to national courts to have regard to the
need for uniformity, international values and the case law of other countries.310
Conclusions and Principal Recommendations
1.

Jurisdiction, whether adjudicative or prescriptive, over alleged trademark
infringement should not be based upon the mere accessibility in a state of a web
site containing the allegedly infringing mark.

2.

In seeking to resolve the problems of choice of law presented by international
trademark disputes, the role of substantive lawmaking must be acknowledged
(and co-opted as a means of solving problems). A series of substantive law
reform, particularly if backed up by institutional structures designed to facilitate
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the development of converging national rules governing international disputes,
will greatly ameliorate what at first might seem intractable problems.
3.

Although the different factors found in common in several of the proposals
discussed in Part III as a resolution of choice of law problems are surely the
central considerations in any decision to apply national trademark law to foreign
online use, it would be a delusion to think that focusing on these considerations
will of itself solve trademark choice of law problems. Situations will persist
where two or more national rights that conflict have commercial effect in more
than one state. Assessments of distinctiveness, confusion, and functionality
(among others) will continue to be subject to national variation.311 And the SCT
Proposal does not attempt to harmonize the consequences of “use,” thus ensuring
that differences in the scope of protection will remain.312 An amalgam of the
strategies canvassed here, including conceptual localization, the use of technology
and the development of separate international standards, will also be relevant to
any broad-based amelioration of the problems of applicable law.

4.

Unless trademark owners are willing to accept a contraction of their theoretical
substantive rights when operating in an online environment, they may find that
they are unable to exercise their own rights on the internet. Such a result would
undermine the purposes of trademark protection, and would threaten the integrity
of consumer understandings that have developed in the offline context.

5.

Trademark owners should actively involve themselves in the conclusion of the
proposed Hague Convention. Adherence to a Hague Convention that requires
recognition and enforcement of judgments, and that enables the consolidation of
intellectual property claims, will allow courts to develop means of reconciling
competing national claims and (depending upon that means) new substantive
intellectual property law tailored to the hugely complex problems of international
intellectual property. To enable this process, the exclusive jurisdiction provision
in the current draft should be re-assessed to ensure that it will not frustrate the
consolidation of claims and the adjudication in a single forum of international
disputes.
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